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ARE WE PUNISHING "ILLEGAL CITIZEN" CHILDREN TO
DETER PARENTS? CRITIQUING BIRTHRIGHT
CITIZENSHIP THROUGH THE CITIZENS-BENEFITS
QUESTION AND CITIZENSHIP REDUCTIONISM
ROBERT F. LEYt
This article proposes that immigration and citizenship law
must address the construction of the immigrant child "situated within
the family." Counter to scholarly literature which has addressed the
need for some form of the best interests of the child standard in
immigration to account for unaccompanied minors, and more
generally, immigrant children, this article proposes that reformation
of immigration law toward a child-centered, or more specifically
family-centric, policy requires attending to the flawed presumptions
that the "anchor baby" myth creates-that only by devising a
language for unintended consequences can we draw closer to recog-
nizing the immigrant child as deserving of the strongest constitu-
tional protections. Because of the dual nature of the immigrant child
as possessing birthright citizenship and noncitizen parents, such
double disenfranchisement, as both child and immigrant, leads to
fundamental disjunctions regarding the meaning of citizenship,
family, and immigration. This article explores that tripartite intersec-
tion and concludes that current discourse must focus on the
substantive meaning of citizenship with particular attention to its
"attendant benefits," and the impact thereof on immigrant families.
Unlike prevailing literature which has primarily analyzed citizenship
through the lens of deportation or nationhood, citizenship discourse
must also emphasize the harsh collateral consequences of our
immigration system and what this means for noncitizens becoming
citizens. Through this analysis, I develop a proper language to care
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for immigrant children in the family unit, through the realization of
the problem of citizen-benefits and citizenship reductionism. The
citizenship-benefits question and citizenship reductionism provide
the focal point from which to analyze the continuing vitality of birth-
right citizenship in the U.S.
INTRODUCTION
A fair amount of undocumented immigrant children cross the
U.S. border annually and fall into the care of the Office for Refugee
Resettlement.1 The demographic of these children paints a disturbing
image of the economic and political strife in their countries of
origin.2 Their plight is exacerbated by the fact that deportations have
doubled over the last ten years.3 Further, because many U.S.-born
children have undocumented parents, many more children will be
impacted by their parents' statuses,4 rendering their own ability to
remain in the U.S. moot. Children are increasingly becoming illegal
entrants, which elevates the question of their impact on our immi-
gration system and on our preparedness as a nation to accept them.5
1 Between 6,100 and 7,500 children are annually cared for by the Office of Refugee
Resettlement. About Unaccompanied Children 's Services, OFFICE OF REFUGEE
RESETLEMENT, http://www.acfhhs.gov/progmms/orr/progmms/ucs/about (last
visited April 10, 2014); see also Lisa Rodriguez Navarro, Comment, An Analysis of
Treatment of Undocumented Immigrant and Refugee Children in INS Detention
and Other Forms of Institutional Custody, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 589, 589
(1998) (noting the increasing migration of unaccompanied minors to escape
country conflict, reunite with family, and to improve economic sustenance).
2 See About Unaccompanied Children's Services, supra note 1. In 2012, 77% of
unaccompanied children are male, the majority of entering children are between 14-
17 years old, 17% are below the age of 14, and 98% of such children come from
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, and Ecuador.
' See Kyung Jin Lee, U.S. Deportations Double over 10 Years, MEDILL REPORTS
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://news.medill.northwestem.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id =
157904&print-l.
' There are approximately 5.5 million children with unauthorized parents in the
U.S., of which three-quarters are U.S. born citizens. See Ajay Chauary, Facing Our
Future: Children in the Aftermath of Immigration Enforcement Urban Institute vii
(2010), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412020 FacingOurFuture final.pdf.
' Rodriguez Navarro, supra note 1.
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By now, it is unspectacular to say that children in immigration law
lack independent rights and interests apart and distinct from their
parents. This adage is certainly true under the federal definition of
"child" under immigration law,6 and it similarly holds true in the
evolution of U.S. juvenile law. In juvenile law, children were origin-
ally seen as dependents and objects of their parents; in immigration
law, they are also derivatives of their parents' petitions seeking to
'7follow or join. No matter the field, it is clear that children maintain a
secondary and inferior status to their supposed caretakers.8 It is also
evident that in both fields, children need institutional support, access
to guardianship or some form of legal representation, 9 and the ability
to voice their preferences and be genuinely listened to and consi-
dered alongside adult counterparts.10
To be clear, this article does not argue that the best interest
standard should be or can be feasibly incorporated into the immi-
gration regime; this solution, while noteworthy and laudable, has
6 It is important to note that the federal definitions of "child" are different when
considering a child for immigration and for nationality reasons. Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(1)(B) (2012), with 8 U.S.C. § ll01(c)(1) (2012). In any event, both
definitions demonstrate the theme that the child is not a distinct agent from the
parent.
7 For greater exploration of federal immigration concept of "child" and for
discussion of lack of child agency in the immigration tradition, see David B.
Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children 's Rights
Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 991-92 (2002) [hereinafter
Thronson, Kids Will be Kids?]. Thronson has argued that "[p]arental possession
and control are the hallmarks of a parent-child relationship in immigration law." Id.
at 992.
8 See id.; see also Jeny Behnke, Comment, Pawns or People? Protecting the Best
Interests of Children in Interstate Custody Disputes, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 699
(1995) (stating that children's interests are solved through the exchange between
parent and state, and that children lack a voice in that dialogue).
9 The issue of legal representation or guardian ad litem models for children in
removal proceedings is beyond the scope of this article. But suffice it to say that the
movement for a Civil Deportation Gideon is a strong one. I use these concerns to
provoke and launch the increasingly important role of the adult undocumented
parent relative to their immigrant children.
10 See Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1317, 1318 (1994) ("Our legal regime purports to respect children but
generally disempowers them.").
2014-2015
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been given substantial attention by the academy and I do not attempt
to summarize the immeasurable discourse here.11 Rather, I make
more nuanced contributions. In Part I, I explain the different ways in
which constitutional protections have developed for the citizen child
under domestic juvenile law and compare it to constitutional protec-
tions of immigrant children 12 under convoluted alienage law. In
doing so, I examine how dependency interpretations1 3 and statutory
underpinnings of immigration law undermine any construction of the
immigrant minor as a rights-holder. The resulting analysis reveals the
potency and impact of this construction for child agency in immigra-
tion. In Part II, I demonstrate that immigrant children receive some-
" See Jacqueline Bhabha, "Not a Sack of Potatoes": Moving and Removing
Children Across Borders, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 208 (2006) (recognizing lack
of best interest standard in immigration law to conflict with international law
standards for child asylum seekers); Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a "Best
Interests of the Child" Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE
HuM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120 (2009) (arguing that the best interest standard should
safeguard "directly affected" children, including if they are affected by their
parents' removal hearings); Deseriee A. Kennedy, Children, Parents & the State:
The Construction of a New Family Ideology, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
78 (2011); Christopher Nugent, Whose Children Are These? Towards Ensuring the
Best Interests and Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 15 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 219, 235 (2006) (observing that a best interest approach demands "direct
representation, advocacy efforts and a central role in shaping [the unaccompanied
minors] future"); Carla L. Reyes, Gender, Law, and Detention Policy: Unexpected
Effects on the Most Vulnerable Immigrants, 25 Wis. J.L. GENDER & SoC'Y 301,
320-23 (2010); Stephanie Sherry, Note, When Jail Fails: Amending the ASFA to
Reduce Its Negative Impact on Children of Incarcerated Parents , 48 FAM. CT. REV.
380 (2010); Erica Stief, Comment, Impractical Relief and the Innocent Victims:
How United States Immigration Law Ignores the Rights of Citizen Children, 79
UMKC L. REV. 477, 487-500, 506 (2010).
12 Throughout this article, I use the term "immigrant children" or "immigrant
minor" interchangeably and to denote children of at least one undocumented parent.
Thus, the phrase encompasses both undocumented children who cross illegally on
their own or with parents, as well as U.S.-born children with resulting citizenship.
These terms also encompass the popular phrase "unaccompanied minor."
13 See M. Arah Somers, Pedro Herrera & Lucia Rodriguez, Constructions of
Childhood and Unaccompanied Children in the Immigration System in the United
States, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 311, 325-31 (2010) (for discussion of
constructions of childhood: developmental, dependency, privacy, autonomous, and
threatening constructions).
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thing less than a best interest of the child standard in immigration
law, undoubtedly as a result of the infusion of plenary immigration
power into state family law. I then proceed in Part III, to contextua-
lize the family and immigration law disjunction by examining the
ASFA's impact on parental and children's rights and advocate for a
more discretionary-based state devolution. After this appropriate
backdrop has been laid, I discuss in Part IV the problem of what I
call the Citizenship-Benefits question and the phenomenon of
Citizenship Reductionism. In Part V, I articulate the importance of
these concepts for our understanding of the state of modem citizen-
ship and what it means for forgotten immigrant children.
Through this extensive foray, I argue that given normative,
systematic, and institutional deficiencies, federal immigration and
citizenship law appear antithetical to notions of family integrity and
reunification, unless one of three things occur: (1) children obtain the
immediate ability to self-petition for the immigration status of their
parents; (2) children gamer their own immigration status independent
of parents' seeking legal recourse on their behalf, or (3) courts
recognize substantive due process rights of immigrant children to a
parent-child relationship. Given the paltry chance that any of these
options bear fruit, I reflect on a model for analyzing future citizen-
ship discussion that respects the child's vulnerability and the need for
the child's voice and agency in immigration and family law. Thus, I
ultimately determine that recognizing the child as a rights-holder
cannot be squared with the dependency theme rampant in immigra-
tion. In other words, immigration law establishes a vexing worn-
ment: children's lack of a valid immigration status justifies differen-
tial treatment and supersedes the state's interest in child welfare and
protection. To the courts and the larger public, immigrant children
appear to have legal capacity to protect their parents from deporta-
tion, warranting a denial of their substantive due process rights. Not
only is this formulation incorrect, as the anchor baby problem is a
myth, 14 but denying children constitutional protections offends our
14 The anchor baby problem is the idea that granting citizenship to children born in
the U.S. provides an incentive for parents to illegally immigrate, so as to use such
children as a "conduit to obtain their own citizenship status or avoid deportation."
Nicole Newman, Note, Birthright Citizenship: The Fourteenth Amendment's
2014-2015
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notions of fairness, morality, and civic responsibility to children. If
anything, it appears that courts are grappling with whether the
accumulation of unlawful presence in the U.S. by noncitizen parents
outweighs children petitioning at the age of twenty-one. Indeed, the
latter represents the normal, regular, and preferred path to eventual
citizenship. It respects the laws and upholds a sense of fairness, even
if the child breached our borders in the first instance. If children
could petition without permitting parents to accumulate unlawful
presence, society may be more receptive to having them within U.S.
borders. Providing them the immediate ability to petition as children,
Continuing Protection Against an American Caste System, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 437, 440-41 (2008) [hereinafter Newman, Birthright Citizenship] (citing Adam
C. Abrahms, Note, Closing the Immigration Loophole: The 14th Amendment's
Jurisdiction Requirement, 12 GEo. IMmIGR. L.J. 469, 471-72 (1998)); see also
Charles Wood, Losing Control of America's Future The Census, Birthright
Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 465, 522 (1999)
(" [E]very week that passes thousands more children of illegal aliens are born in this
country, and each is now granted citizenship. The political impact of such
individuals increase greatly when.. .at age twenty-one.. they can petition for the
legal immigration of their parents and other relatives, each of whom can naturalize
and each of whom can petition for additional immigrants who may also become
citizens."); Christine J. Hsieh, Note, American Born Legal Permanent Residents? A
ConstitutionalAmendment Proposal, 12 GEO. IMmIGR. L.J. 511, 512-13 (1998).
This myth is further propagated and popularized by the fact that the
immigration laws do reward family ties to an extent within the statutory framework.
Waivers may be available. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1104, 1182(h), (i), 1227(a)(1)(H) (2012); Homeland Security Act
(HSA), 6 U.S.C. §§ 251, 271 (2012). Furthermore, if denied a waiver, certain aliens
may qualify for discretionary relief before an immigration judge. See Immigration
Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2008) (cancellation of removal); see also
Maritza I. Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law: The Vital Role of Judicial
Discretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84 TEMP. L. REv. 637
(2012). Courts or decision-makers are more likely to positively exercise discretion
if strong family ties and good moral character can be shown. See Kevin Lapp,
Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. Citizenship, 87 IND.
L.J. 1571 (2012). The presence of family ties undoubtedly makes a difference,
especially if removal would harm current U.S. citizens. See Adam B. Cox,
Citizenship, Standing and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 390-403 (2004)
(for argument that plenary power is a doctrine of standing and asserting that plenary
power should be responsive to citizens' rights, thus appreciating immigration law's
associational and collateral harms to citizens as cognizable injuries).
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however, would lead to extravagant influxes resulting in grave eco-
nomic and social implications for the nation. The paradox cannot be
understated: for children to be full agents, it is logical that they have
the ability to self-petition, but providing this entitlement incentivizes
illegal immigration and would purport to legitimize the anchor baby
dilemma. A full child as rights-holder model remains terribly
rebuffed by the economic and political realities of the world.
Cardinal concerns over resource allocation and social ser-
vices drive the anti-immigrant sentiment despite these populations
being ostensibly open to assimilation and integration. These concerns
have led to widespread inflammatory and erroneous ad hominem
attacks against the immigrant population, which have only intensified
with the broad liberalization of immigration quotas and surge in
immigration in recent years. 15 Riding this wave has been acrimoni-
ous legislation, culminating in a hostile and discriminatory atmos-
phere for immigrants. 16 To be obvious, the existing parent-centered
immigration framework 17 is highly politicized, draconian, and prob-
lematic. Any due process revolution seeking to value the undocu-
mented child as worthy of substantive and procedural due process
requires fundamentally changing not simply state or federal laws, but
the manner in which we appreciate the parent-child relationship, that
is, the family unit itself We must address a family's rights versus an
individual immigrant's rights within that family and the discordance
that such relationality causes. It is inevitable that preserving the best
15 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA), Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
(abolishing the national origins quotas).
16 The 1996 immigration reforms enhanced the possibility of removal, even for the
most minor crimes. See Kaiti L. Griffith, Perfecting Public Immigration Legisla-
tion: Private Immigration Bills and Deportable Lawful Permanent Residents, 18
GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 273, 276 (2004) (stating that "even if an LPR has lived in the
United States since childhood, she can be subject to mandatory deportation for
almost any criminal conviction-including misdemeanors, such as shoplifting or a
bar fight.").
17 See David B. Thronson, You Can't Get Here from Here: Toward a More Child-
Centered Immigration Law, 14 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 58, 67-72 (2006)
[hereinafter Thronson, Here from Here] (providing analysis that the systematic
devaluation of children and their interests supports conceptualization of current
immigration regime as parent-centered).
2014-2015
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interests of the family through a child-centered methodology entails
difficult conceptual and fiscal costs and subverts the fundamental
necessity-a language that appreciates immigrant families as valu-
able and on par with the institution of the traditional non-immigrant
family. 18
I. THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION HAS
EVOLVED DIFFERENTLY FOR IMMIGRANT
CHILDREN THAN IT HAS FOR CITIZEN
CHILDREN
The marginalization of the child in juvenile law is paralleled
in many ways by its corollary in immigration, the immigrant minor.
It is no surprise, then, that American scholars have liberally argued
for an incorporation of juvenile and family law principles, most
notably the best interests of the child standard, to offset increasingly
restrictive and destructive immigration policy. What scholars have
largely missed, however, is that substantive and procedural protec-
tions for the immigrant, non-citizen minor have not evolved similarly
or as benevolently as they have for citizen minors. While I concede
that the best interest standard may find solace in placating inadequate
detention conditions, I am not convinced that the best interest stan-
dard can be actualized absent an exhaustive overhaul of the existing
immigration regime. Rather, as a result of the different way constitu-
tional jurisprudence has developed for the immigrant child, the best
interest standard remains pragmatically irreconcilable with immigra-
tion law due to immigration's confounding difficulty with balancing
the benefits of (birthright) citizenship and immigration restriction-
18 See Naomi R. Cah, Children 's Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster
Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189, 1223 (1999) (noting that federal law
should return to presumption that children are best cared for in their own families
and communities of origin); see also Victoria Degtyareva, Note, Defining Family in
Immigration Law: Accounting for Nontraditional Families in Citizenship by
Descent, 120 YALE L.J. 862, 903-08 (2011) (arguing that immigration law should
adopt a unified definition of family based on interpersonal, not biological,
relationships).
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ism. 19 Put differently, I illuminate lessons that draw not only from
the similarities between citizen and immigrant juveniles, but the
differences that immigrant juveniles face in navigating U.S. immi-
gration laws.2°
To fully appreciate the anomalies in immigration jurispru-
dence touching the state of constitutional protection of immigrant
children, it is useful to discuss domestic juvenile law cases and juxta-
pose their differences with cases affecting immigrant minors. Such a
comparative analysis, most notably through an examination of the
seminal cases of In re Gault,21 Santosky v. Kramer,22 and their pro-
geny contrasted with Reno v. Flores23 and the resulting Settlement
Agreement, has rarely been done, but sheds light on the difficult-to-
rationalize failure of juvenile justice to filter into immigrant
children's lives.
19 Indeed, the only reference statutorily to best interests of the child is in the case of
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS). See Immigration Nationality Act (INA),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012). This form of relief deals with children who are
dependent on a juvenile court, and for whom reunification with one or both parents
is not viable due to neglect, abuse, abandonment, or similar basis under state law,
and for whom it has been determined that it would not be in the best interest of the
child to be returned to the previous country of nationality or habitual residence.
While this is an excellent first step to infusing best interest principles into
immigration law, it will be a long while until the standard can actually be said to
influence immigration's current petition-based system.
2' Because juveniles lack the ability to petition others into the U.S. until they are
twenty-one and no longer "children," the current forms of immigration relief
available to them only continue to subject them to dependency, objectification, and
to a secondary, less than full agent status. This relief, found in Title VII of the
United States Code, consists of asylum, § 208; SIJS, § 1101(27)(J); T-Visas,
§ 1101(a)(15)(T); U-Visas, § 1101(a)(15)(U); and Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) or "battered child" petitions, § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iv), (a)(1)(B)(iii). Such
relief, where they can self-petition as full agents, often requires the juvenile to
suffer harm or become wards of the state-no relief exists where they can petition
independently of this harm "requirement," and only SIJS is particular and exclusive
to children. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 l(c)(1) (2009) (requiring SIJS applicants be under
twenty-one).
21 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
23 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
2014-2015
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In re Gault established that children, like adults, possess
certain liberty interests.24 The case demanded that children in delin-
quency proceedings must be afforded procedural due process through
notice of charges, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-
examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination.25 In that
landmark decision,26 the child at issue was hauled into custody, with-
out notification to the parents, because a neighbor complained that he
and a group of friends were the perpetrators in an offensive telephone
call to her. The parents received no notice at the time of custody
and only oral notice the day before the hearing, which failed to set
out the charges against the child.28 In re Gault, undoubtedly, repre-
sented a paragon of children's due process rights. The Court's
analysis reflected that the juvenile's possibility of detention until the
age of majority represented a substantial likelihood of a deprivation
of liberty comparable to felony imprisonment for adults.29 The Court
realized that what was necessary was an infusion of adult protections
applied to juveniles.30
The Gault legacy only blossomed in Santosky v. Kramer.31 In
Santosky, the Court professed that the liberty interest in family
integrity is "far more precious than any property right" 32 and went
further to hold that "the State cannot presume the child and his
24 387 U.S. at 13 (1967) (stating "whatever may be the precise impact, neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone").251d. at 33-57.
26 The case is hailed as "the most significant case of the first century of the juvenile
court." ALIDA V. MERLO, Courts, Juvenile, I. History, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE 79, 82 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds.,
2003).
27 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.281d. at 33-34.
29 Id. at 36 ("A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be
'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in
seriousness to a felony prosecution.").
30 In proclaiming those adult protections, the Court stated that, "The juvenile needs
the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into
the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he
has a defense and to prepare and submit it." Id.
31 See 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
3 2 1d. at 758.
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parents are adversaries" at the preliminary fact-finding stage.3 3 Most
notable however, for its possible application for immigrant children,
is the Court's conclusion that the "fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child
does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents
or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.",34 Unfor-
tunately, this profound statement led not to a principle or rule
regarding family unity or the sanctity of the parent-child relationship
generally, but in the now well-settled clear and convincing standard
for parental termination hearings 5 While the standard is an incredi-
ble gain, a determination concerning the protection due the parent-
child relationship36 would have clarified the existing perplexity
caused by parental deportation proceedings in the immigration
context.
The application of the Gault and Santoksy legacy applied to
immigrant minors may only produce mixed results. First, Gault's
recognition of adult protections applied to children does not equate
nicely in immigration where the parents actually possess weaker
claims to status and are more constitutionally infirm. The little, if
any, rights immigrant children receive from their "illegal" parents
raises doubt whether Gault can breach the barrier legal status
imposes on immigrant children specifically. Moreover, any infusion
of adult protections applied to immigrant juveniles will only buff the
collateral impact of immigration status on the family, and while this
is worthwhile, it is hardly satisfying. Second, Santosky's language
that the liberty interest "does not evaporate" simply because parents
have not been "model parents" may, by comparison, be efficacious if
it is afforded substantial constitutional weight in future proceedings.
33Id. at 760.
34Id. at 753.35 Id. at 747-48.
36 It is essential to address the family unit or parent-child relationship through a
citizenship gloss, and at the same time, address citizenship through family's lived
experiences in the U.S. For a similar call of the need for courts to converse over and
legal importance of the parent-child relationship, see Julia Halloran McLaughlin,
The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 113, 160-64
(2009).
2014-2015
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While dicta, the Court's strong appraisal appears enticing for
immigrant families.
Where In re Gault and Santoksy spawned an era of due
process revolution for citizen children, Reno v. Flores has narrowed
due process rights for immigrant children.37 Flores curtailed the
constitutional protections generally granted to even aliens whose
presence in the U.S. is unlawful.38 Proponents who assert that immi-
grant children substantially benefit from general juvenile law protec-
tions fail to observe the different way in which due process has
evolved in the realm of immigration. The saying that children receive
the worst of both worlds39 certainly holds greater application for
immigrant children who receive the short end of juvenile law, immi-
gration law, and state welfare law.4 ° In Flores, unaccompanied
41minors were held in detention pending their deportation hearings,
and the question arose under whose care these alien children should
be released while they await their deportation hearing.42 Whereas
Gault expanded procedural due process protections for citizen
7 See 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
38 But see Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (citing Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950) ("Even one whose presence in this country is
unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.")).
39 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-18 & 18 n.23 (1967) ("There is evidence... that
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds:
that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
40 See Devon A. Corneal, On the Way to Grandmother 's House: Is U.S. Immigra-
tion Policy More Dangerous Than the Big Bad Wolffor Unaccompanied Juvenile
Aliens?, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 609, 617 (2004) (citing Ellen J. Durkee, Special
Problems of Custody of Unaccompanied Refugee Children in the United States, 3
Mich. YBI Legal Stud. 197 (1982) ("Unaccompanied alien children, then, 'fall into
the no mans land between U.S. immigration law and state welfare law."') (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also Nina Rabin, Disappearing
Parents: Immigration Enforcement and the Child Welfare System, 44 CoNN. L.
REV. 99 (2011) (chronicling the systematic failure of state systems in immigration
enforcement).
41 These alien juveniles were certified as a class, consisting of those under the age
of 18 detained by the INS because "a parent or legal guardian fails to personally
appear to take custody of them' (internal quotation marks omitted). 507 U.S. at
296.
42 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 310 (1992).
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children in delinquency proceedings, Flores denied substantive pro-
tections for immigrant minors because the latter's lack of immigra-
tion status justified this differential treatment (i.e. the detention or
legal custody in the form of institutional confinement) and because
the then-INS's minimum standards of care, in such a facility, were
"good enough.",43
The Flores Court thus continues to reduce the already
minimal constitutional safeguards immigrant children receive by
narrowly defining the scope of due process rights for immigrant
children.44 Indeed, the Court altered the children's claim that they
possessed a liberty right to be free from physical restraint into a
question regarding whether immigrant children, or even children
generally, possessed a right to non-institutional confinement where
private placement may be better.45 Within that framing of the ques-
tion, the inevitable answer must be no, as it can hardly be claimed
that this preference for non-institutional custody is "so rooted in
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental."46 Consequently, pursuant to mere rationality review, the
Flores Court found that no substantive due process right was violated
through the INS's detention policy, and no procedural due process
4,7right was violated per lack of INS custody review.
" Id. at 305. This thereby satisfied, according to the majority opinion by Scalia, the
requirement that the INS had a rational government interest in selecting confine-
ment over release to other, possible more preferable custodians stating "[w]here a
juvenile has no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, where the govern-
ment does not intend to punish the child, and where the conditions of government
custody are decent and humane, such custody surely does not violate the
Constitution. It is rationally connected to a governmental interest in 'preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child."' Id. at 303 (internal citations omitted).
" See Denise E. Choquette, Note, Reno v. Flores and the Supreme Court's
Continuing Trend Toward Narrowing Due Process Rights, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 115, 115 (1995).
15 See Flores, 507 U.S. at 305. In other words, the court frames the issue to be
whether these children had the right to be released to an unrelated adult when their
parent, relative, or legal guardian was missing or unwilling to appear to retrieve
them. Id. at 302.
46 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (quoting Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).47id.
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The Flores court's discussion of Schall v. Martin48 is simi-
larly striking from the vantage point of immigrants' rights. Schall
approved post-arrest, pre-trial detention only for juveniles who posed
a continuing danger to the community. 49 But rather than extend this
promising juvenile law principle to immigrant children, the Flores
Court ultimately rejected its application, instead citing to Schall only
to come to the conclusion that "minimum standards must be met, and
the child's fundamental rights must not be impaired., 50 The Court,
through ever-clever use of framing, determined the immigrant chil-
dren were in legal custody and not detention "because the facilities in
which immigrant minors [were] detained [were] 'not correctional
institutions, but facilities that meet state licensing requirements for
the provision of shelter care, foster care, group care, and related
services to dependent children."' 51 The Court's choice to find these
children were in legal custody meant the higher constitutional safe-
guards reserved for those facing greater deprivations of liberty, as in
confinement or detention, would not apply.52 This outcome may
confuse those unversed in the peculiarities of immigration law.
Even before Flores, the immigrant minor's due process rights
were already extremely diminished because of plenary power's long-
standing commitment to deference to the political branches. 53 It is
48 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
'9 Id. at 273-74. The case also stands for the popular phrase that "juveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody." Id. at 265.51 Flores, 507 U.S. at 304-05.511d. at 298.52 Id. at 303-05
53 The authority Congress possesses in immigration is broad and exclusive. See Toll
v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70
(1972); Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (holding that
"whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned"); Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)
(extending lax judicial review and plenary power doctrine from exclusion to
deportation of aliens); Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (establishing
that immigration is an area where decisions of the political branches are
"conclusive upon the judiciary"). The doctrine has been discussed in depth by the
literature and I do not repeat the history here. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious
Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitu-
tional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1626 (1992). Indeed, Congress's authority
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not surprising, then, when Scalia notes the juveniles' lack of immi-
gration status validates their detention. 54 It is clear the majority draws
the line of demarcation for protection at immigration status, regard-
less of the needs of the child; the denial of liberty here is appropriate
because these children possessed the "offense" of alienage status.55
requires that "[]udicial power over immigration and naturalization is extremely
limited." See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 455 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring);
see also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1,
10 (1977) (ruling that "[c]ontrol over immigration and naturalization is entrusted
exclusively to the federal government and a state has no power to interfere.").
However, while the plenary power doctrine remains popular in the courts,
it has been the subject of scathing academic attack. See Louis Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and
Its Progency, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862 (1987) ("It has no foundation in
principle. It is a constitutional fossil, a remnant of a prerights jurisprudence that we
have proudly rejected in other respects. Nothing in our Constitution, its theory, or
history warrants exempting any exercise of governmental power from
constitutional restraint."); Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the
Border to Political Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REv. 930, 942 (1987); Peter J. Spiro,
Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 340-41 (2002)
(describing plenary power as "a rights-subverting constitutional anomaly" that has
"long been relegated to a sort of constitutional hall of shame"). While many affirm
that plenary power will likely continue to weaken over time, as the Court becomes
more inclined and accustomed to finding that undocumented persons deserve
stronger due process protections against arbitrary or unfair situations, the more
likely trend is that plenary power only weakens in moments of historical safety, but
strengthens in times of national security and fear. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 695 (2001) (striking indefinite detention of deportable aliens and holding in
dicta that plenary power is still "subject to important constitutional limitations").
Plenary power, at least through historical function, appears to operate in cycles that
constrict and expand and with these contractions; the rights of immigrants likewise
are limited or magnified. See generally Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power
Doctrine after September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 701 (2005).
" See Flores, 507 U.S. at 305-06 (citing Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976);
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (inferring that legislative power of
immigration is complete and that because of Congress's power over immigration
and naturalization, Congress can create rules for immigrants that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens). Indeed, the Court has declared "over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete." Fiallo,
430 U.S. at 792.
" Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 1014 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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Simply put, being an alien cultivates notions of difference
and fear, not to mention implications for the nation's sovereignty,
self-preservation, and national values56 that result in inconceivable
laws if applied to citizens.57 The bleak legislative reality surrounding
the endemic immigration problem situates the immigrant child with
the concomitant burdens of adults. When the rights of immigrant
parents are curtailed, the undocumented child similarly stands to
lose. The immigrant child has neither a parens patriae government to
care for them,58 nor a family structure to nurture them. Rather, they
are assaulted on all fronts: deserted or forcibly separated from their
parents, circumscribed of basic legal protections and necessities, and
powerless to navigate the immigration laws.59 They are in the U.S.
alone: constitutionally disabled, legally incapacitated, and emotion-
ally vulnerable.6 ° Plenary power has bled into traditional areas of
state Tenth Amendment power, specifically family law, and immi-
grant children are ensnared in the tangle.61 The seminal decision in
56 See Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration As Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the
Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 32 n.
146 (2010) (describing fear of immigration invasion as an "existential threat" to
U.S. autonomy).
57 See United States v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1940) (noting that inherent
sovereign authority of a nation allows it to admit or deny foreigners because doing
so is integral to self-preservation); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521-22
(2003); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,
659 (1892).
58 For a discussion of whether states have fulfilled their obligation to children under
parens patriae, see Jessica E. Marcus, The Neglectful Parens Patriae: Using Child




61 Thronson has defined this delicate "tangle" nicely stating "[a]cknowledging that
immigration law functions as family law provides an opportunity to incorporate
family law values and sensibilities into the immigration reform conversation."
David B. Thronson, Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law as
Federal Family Law in the Context of Child Custody, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 453, 511
(2008) [hereinafter, Thronson, Custody and Contradictions]; see also S. Adam
Ferguson, Not Without My Daughter: Deportation and the Termination of Parental
Rights, 22 GEO. IMmIGR. L.J. 85, 89-90 (2007) (addressing federalism's complicity
Critiquing Birthright Citizenship
Flores, nevertheless, culminated in the Flores Settlement Agreement
(FSA) upon remand to the District Court, which established appro-
priate humane conditions for immigrant children and provided for
62better treatment and release to parents. This development, while an
achievement for immigrant children's rights,63 does not address the
broader constitutional question of respect due to the family unit itself
Until that central matter is assessed and a clear tenet can be devised
from judicial common law regarding the parent-child relationship,
we are bound to have agreements such as the FSA, which are pier-
cing in paper, but dull and undermined in practice.64 The conceptual
jurisprudential evasion of that question may be supported by the
reality that federal plenary power has substituted state parens patriae
to the immigrant child's detriment; it victimizes immigrants and
divests residents of sound constitutional principles.65
in creating confusion over appropriate sphere to decide termination of parental
rights).
62 See Rebecca M. L6pez, Comment, Codifying the Flores Settlement Agreement:
Seeking to Protect Immigrant Children in US. Custody, 95 MARQ. L. REv. 1635,
1648-51 (2012) (for further elaboration on goals of the FSA and INS compliance
with the Agreement); see also Areti Georgopoulos, Beyond the Reach of Juvenile
Justice: The Crimes of Unaccompanied Immigrant Children Detained by the
United States, 23 LAw & INEQ. 117 (2005) (for the same).
63 The FSA provides that the child should be held in the "least restrictive setting"
and treated with "dignity, respect and special concern for their vulnerability as
minors." Nationwide settlement regulating INS treatment of detained minors:
Flores v. Ashcroft, CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
http://centerforhumanrights.org/children/Document.2004-06-18.8124043749 (last
visited Apr. 16, 2014).
6' L6pez, supra note 62, at 1676-77 (noting that because of immigration
enforcement's commitment to a criminal law model, immigrants are short-changed
of protections, and even though the FSA's mandate was a laudable one, "the current
system does not ensure adequate protection for children, and the DHS continues to
have broad discretion to open family detention in the future.").
65 See Marcus, supra note 59.
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II. THE PLAYERS AT THE TABLE IN JUVENILE
LAW DIFFER FROM THOSE OPERATING IN
IMMIGRATION LAW: COOPERATION IN
THE FORMER VERSUS CONFRONTATION
IN THE LATTER
While children have similar needs, notwithstanding their
legal status, where these similarities diverge is the role of parents in
traditional juvenile law versus their position in immigration law.
These differences spawn from the fact that the agents and parties
involved in domestic juvenile law have radically different interests
and perspectives than those in immigration law. Domestic juvenile
law can be largely organized around three polarizing, but potentially
cooperating interests: the rights of the parents, the children, and the
66state. Such use of "cooperating" is not to essentialize that these
parties can possess different means and often do conflict, but that
these three forces fight for the care, protection, and well-being of the
child albeit in different ways.67 In other words, their interests are
aligned in the sense that they all share the similar goal of the welfare
of the child. In immigration law, by contrast, the actors are keenly
inapposite, and parents of the immigrant minor may refuse to act in
the best interests of their children, as it is often the parents' actions,
their illegal entry for example, that are imputed to their children. In
the specific case of U.S. born citizen children with undocumented
66 Francine T. Sherman & Hon. Jay Blitzman, Children 's Rights and Relationships:
A Legal Framework, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND
PRACTICE 68-90 (Francine T. Sherman & Francine H. Jacobs eds. 2011)
(describing complex interplay between child, parent, and state in legal patchwork);
Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children 's Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267,
287 (1995) (citing Glenn Collins, Debate over Rights of Children Is Intensifying,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1981, at Al, B4 (quoting Robert Mnookin, Professor of Law
at the University of California at Berkeley) ("You can discern three distinct themes:
First, that parents have primary responsibility to raise children. Second, that the
state has special responsibilities to children, to intervene to protect them. And third,
that children as people have rights of their own and have rights as individuals in
relation to the family and in relation to the state. These themes are constantly in
conflict.").
67 See Minow, supra note 66.
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parents, the citizenship right is seemingly rendered meaningless
because if the parents are removed, so too are the children, as depen-
dents, likely to join in that removal. 68 Further, the federal agents in
the immigration context must juggle their own labyrinth of immigra-
tion law and policy: balancing the needs of immigrant children
through the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR),69 the mandate to
expel unauthorized immigrants through the Department for Home-
land Security (DHS), as well as the interests of all these contingen-
cies, both in the government's favor and in the alien's equities,
through the immigration courts, and the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR).
The problem is easily realized here. Where domestic juvenile
law has different interpretations and understandings of what is best
for a citizen child, it nonetheless is working toward the same goal-
what is best suited for the child's well-being, growth, and develop-
ment even if the means and methodology differ.70 The question of
61 Immigrant parents usually determine whether their children are deported with
them, unless there is a finding of abuse or neglect leading to state custody of the
minor children. As is often the case, it is meaningless to remain in the U.S. without
one's parents. Courts affirm that the child can exercise his or her citizenship right at
any time after the de facto deportation. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
69 The ORR takes custody of immigrant children who cannot be repatriated. See
Detention and Release of Juveniles, 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(g) (2003). While Canadian
and Mexican children are exceptions, all other unaccompanied immigrant children
are placed under ORR's jurisdiction. The ORR also assumes custody of those
children who cannot be reunified with family or other suitable caretakers.
70 Indeed, the development of a separate juvenile court system apart from the adult
criminal system can be seen as domestic law endeavoring to accommodate the
special case of children: their particular vulnerability as well as their rehabilitative
potential. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND
STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 1227-32 (2000).
The immigration system, however, has no special court for children; rather, the
immigration judge must frequently consider the child's and parents' situation in
forging his or her own determination. Immigrant juveniles, thus, are treated like
immigrant adults in removal proceedings. See Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids?, supra
note 7, at 1000-03 (observing that unaccompanied minors are treated as "adults by
default" and that immigration courts are neither designed nor equipped to handle
children). The immigration court system, therefore, takes a "one-size-fits-all
approach" that fails to account for children's unique development, that fails to
recognize that children may "experience persecution differently than adults," and
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territoriality and the child's ability to stay in the U.S. is irrelevant. By
contrast, for the immigrant child, the lack of immigration status
controls and subsumes the question of best interests, such that each
agent in an unaccompanied minor adjudication, for example, is faced
with harrowing conflicts of interest. It is certainly an understatement
to say that the immigrant juvenile is caught in the middle. From a
family and juvenile law perspective, a best interest of the child
analysis requires stabilizing the normality of the parent-child contact
with his or her noncitizen parents. From an immigration law perspec-
tive, the immigrant child should be removed from the U.S. if not
born within its borders, and even for those children with birthright
citizenship, removal may nonetheless be the ideal course of action to
continue a normal family parent-child relationship. 71 Family law and
immigration law are incredibly at odds72 and citizenship becomes the
battlefront-the best interest of the child is to both remain in the U.S.
and do so in a stable parent-child relationship. Current immigration
that fails to consider that children "recollect and articulate traumatic experiences"
differently. Prison Guard or Parent?: INS Treatment of Unaccompanied Refugee
Children, WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN 5-6
(2002), http://womensrefugeecommission.org/resources/document/253-prison-
guard-or-parent-ins-treatment-of-unaccompanied-refugee-children (describing
historical treatment of children's asylum claims and how accompanied children's
claims were subsumed by parent's claim even if child's claim presents the strongest
legal account, and explaining that unaccompanied children were treated as adults).
71 While, at first glance, it appears that the need for the "family" itself interferes
here, in actuality, it is the U.S.-born child's dependent nature that forecloses his or
her ability to properly and effectively exercise his or her birthright citizenship right
to remain in the U.S. It remains virtually impossible to construct a child-directed or
child as autonomous individual model when the very definition of "child," even in
the non-immigration sense, necessitates the child's dependency and lack of agency.
72 See David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experien-
ces of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEx. HISP. J.L. &
POL'Y 45, 48 (2005) [hereinafter Thronson, Of Boarders and Best Interests]
(stating that "family law and immigration law are motivated by divergent and often
conflicting policies which are difficult, and on occasion, impossible to reconcile").
In explaining the "peculiar and conflicted mix" of immigration and family law,
Thronson discerns that "there is no area of law in which the federal government's
power is more robust than in immigration and there is no area of law more fully
reserved to the state than domestic relations." Id. (internal citations omitted).
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law simply cannot accommodate these two interests simultaneously.
An analysis of what citizenship means must enter the dialogue. 3
To nuance this critique, I discuss the different roles of citizen
and noncitizen parents in relation to their children physically in the
U.S. Citizen parents can argue for the best interests of their child in
juvenile proceedings; they have the option even if they choose to
otherwise encourage their children confess to the truth in a disposi-
tion. Additionally, these parents can develop a nurturing relationship
with their children without jeopardizing their own safety and ability
to remain in the U.S. They can raise issues and cases on behalf of
their children, and thus meaningfully protect their children's rights in
that way. 4 In other words, parents, if willing, can be agents for their
children. By contrast, the adult noncitizen parents of unaccompanied
minors may have trouble reaching or not being able to take custody
of their children who cross the border on their own and end up in
DHS custody. Thus, the noncitizen parent suffers from a Hobson's
choice: he or she often reveals his or her own unlawful presence in
the U.S. when opting to preserve family unity with the child,75 and as
is often the case, the undocumented parent is deported, shortly
followed by the child "electing" to join in removal. 6 In the latter
71 See discussion infra notes 93-112 and accompanying text in Part IV. My point is
to engage the substantive meaning of citizenship underlying lived, contextualized
experience of the immigrant family in order to launch discussion regarding the
dynamic nature of citizenship. For a fuller exposition on the history and develop-
ment of birthright citizenship instead, see Patrick J. Charles, Decoding the
Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause: Unlawful Immigrants, Allegiance,
Personal Subjection, and the Law, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 215-52 (2012); Dan
Stein & John Bauer, Interpreting the 14th Amendment: Automatic Citizenship for
Children of Illegal Immigrants?, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 127 (1996).
71 See Corneal, supra note 40, at 624-25.
75 See Beth S. Rose, Note, INS Detention ofAlien Minors: The Flores Challenge, 1
GEo. IMmIGR. L.J. 329, 331 (1986) (citing Complaint at 11, Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292 (1993) (No. No. 91-905) (for example of Flores's mother refusing to
appear to take physical custody of her fifteen year old daughter in immigration
detention for fear of outing her own lack of immigration status).
76 See Carr, supra note 11, at 130-40 (discussing that in the context of families
where children have different legal status than parents, the parent and child's
interest may be far from aligned and recognizing only parental interests may pose
severe consequences for the child). Indeed, noncitizen parents must often choose
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example, the child often follows, as best interests ordinarily entails
family unification to a potentially dangerous country of origin. The
noncitizen parent therefore cannot effectively advocate for their chil-
dren's rights, as doing so may implicate the authenticity of their own
legal status. This contingency makes any proposed parent-as-guar-
dian model itself conflicted. Moreover, because children may enter
on their own before their parents, all too often, the parental figure, as
the child's agent, is lacking in a custody proceeding upon entry at the
border. Indeed, the rights of noncitizen parents and children are
already adverse, such that state intervention often comes as a neces-
sary evil to protect interests of the latter against the former. For
noncitizen or mixed-status families, both the best interests of the
child and parental rights frameworks miss their mark, as the parent
and children rely on state intervention, and certain actors are missing
at critical stages of the custody process. Both frameworks cannot
account for the political overtures 7 involved in the dynamics of
noncitizen and mixed-status families and neither comports with the
increasing institutionalization and creation of the "mixed status-
politicized immigrant family.,, 7 8 For immigrant families, neither
between "abandoning their children in a foreign land and risking the torture of their
children." Id. at 120.
77 See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant:
A Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV. 65 (2009) (providing profiles of various viewpoints on
the current debate for immigration reform and the impact of the undocumented
population); see also CNN Opinion Poll, CNN OPINION RES. CoRP. (Aug. 11, 2010,
12:00 PM), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2010/images/08/11/rellla.pdf; Poll:
Voters Oppose Birthright Citizenship, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Apr. 19, 2011, 10:00
PM), http://www.upi.com/Top News/US/2011/04/19/Poll-Voters-oppose-
birthright-citizenship/UPI-55301303264800/ (providing statistics from voter polls
demonstrating strong anti-immigrant public sentiment regarding federal stance on
immigration, benefits to immigrants, and birthright citizenship).
78 The mixed-status family is a family where "all family members do not share a
common immigration or citizenship status" and this phenomenon of our
immigration laws "makes it virtually impossible to conceive of policies that will
affect immigrants without also intimately affecting a broader cross section of the
national population, including millions of U.S. citizen children." Thronson Here
from Here, supra note 17, at 61; see also Thronson Of Boarders and Best lnterests,
supra note 72, at 49-53 (for description of rise of mixed-status families leading to
immigration drastically being introduced into family courts).
Critiquing Birthright Citizenship
parent nor child possesses complete agency or autonomy, and the
parent-as-agent model for the child's rights in immigration is non-
existent.
III. THE ASFA REMAINS A PROBLEM FOR
IMMIGRANT PARENTS AND TERMINATES
THEIR PARENTAL RIGHTS WITHOUT A
PARENTAL FITNESS HEARING
The state of adult noncitizen parents' parental rights to their
noncitizen children and U.S.-born citizen children is needlessly
complex. 7 9 The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) 0
Mixed-status families constitute an increasingly growing number of U.S.
families and their needs and interests differ from full-citizen families and noncitizen
families. See Michael E. Fix & Wendy Zimmerman, All Under One Roof Mixed-
Status Families in an Era of Reform, THE URBAN INST. 1 (1999); Michael E. Fix et
al., The Integration of Families in the United States, THE URBAN INST. 15-17
(2001), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/immig integration.pdf (85% of
immigrant families with children and with at least one noncitizen parent are mixed-
status families); Jeffrey Passel, The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized
Migrant Population in the U.S., PEw HISPANIC CENTER RESEARCH REPORT 3 (Mar.
7, 2006), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf (majority of mixed-status
families consist of children with status and parents without). Additionally, of
children up to the age of seventeen, 23% had at least one foreign-born parent for
each of years 2010 and 2011. See America's Children in Brief Key National
Indicators of Well-Being, FEDERAL INTERAGENCY FORuM ON CHILD AND FAMiLY
STATISTICS 18 (2012), http://www.childstats.gov/pdf/ac2012/ac 12.pdf. The most
critical aspect of mixed-status families, however, is that their needs are incredibly
complex and the deportation of parental figures often leads inevitably to whole
scale deportation of the family. Yahner notes correctly when he described that for
these families "the harshness of immigration laws applies unevenly to each family
member" and "in the instance of a whole family subject to deportation, the conse-
quences are natural and uniform, if no less harsh..." See Timothy E. Yahner,
Splitting the Baby: Immigration, Family Law, and the Problem of the Single
Deportable Parent, 45 AKRON L. REv. 769, 780-81 (2011-2012).
" A discussion of the scope of an incarcerated parent's due process rights during
the termination process is beyond the scope of this article. For a fuller discussion
see Phillip M. Genty, Procedural Due Process Rights of Incarcerated Parents in
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. FAM. L.
757 (1991).
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presents a challenge to the continuity of a parent-immigrant child
relationship in many instances, despite arising out of the need to
address the deplorable state of adoption and foster care at the time.81
Ironically, the ASFA was enacted to foster "permanence for children
in the foster care system. 82 The ASFA embodied a new shift in child
welfare policy at the time from the traditional and historical emphasis
on reunification of foster children with their biological parents to
promoting adoptions of these children into new families 83 while
simultaneously prioritizing children's health and safety. Of particular
impact for immigrant families is the requirement that states initiate
termination proceedings against parents if the child has been in foster
care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. 84 Such a state
requirement disproportionately affects women and forces them to
lose custody of their children while incarcerated and serving their
80 Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
81 See Stephanie Sherry, Note, When Jail Fails: Amending the ASFA to Reduce Its
Negative Impact on Children of Incarcerated Parents, 48 FAM. CT. REv. 380, 382-
83 (2010) (for discussion of purpose and history of the ASFA).
82 143 Cong. Rec. S12, 668-71 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
DeWine); Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2001).
83 See H.R. REP. No. 105-77, pt. IB, at 7 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2739, 2740; Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?: The
Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 112
(1999).
84 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) ("[I]n the case of a child who has been in foster care under
the responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months.. .the State shall
file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents..."). The statute
proceeds to delineate some minor exceptions to these termination proceedings:
where the child is being cared for by a relative, there is a compelling reason why
filing a petition would not be in the best interest of the child, or the state agency has
not provided the services needed for safe reunification, § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii). It is
essential to note that the state bringing the petition and thus challenging the parents'
parental rights to the children still must satisfy by clear and convincing evidence a
state ground for termination, usually neglect, abuse, or abandonment of the child.
Emily K. Nicholson, Comment, Racing Against the AFSA Clock: How Incar-
cerated Parents Lose More Than Freedom, 45 DuQ. L. REv. 83, 85 n. 16 (2006).
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sentences.85 Furthermore, many noncitizen parents, detained pending
removal, will likewise lose their parental rights while in civil deten-
tion. It becomes clear that the ASFA reflects an "ideology of the
ideal family" 86 that excludes the concept of immigrant and mixed-
status families from that proper vision.87 The "institution" of the
immigrant family, through whatever form it takes, cannot be squared
with the ASFA's fifteen-month trigger provision. The impact of the
ASFA on immigrant families demonstrates the severe lack of consti-
tutional safeguards for adult noncitizen parents, who have the right to
their children seized by the state. The ASFA essentially forces and
deputizes states to terminate parental rights under the guise of foster-
ing permanence within the foster system. Such a deputizing of states
as enforcement agents-through the ASFA's termination of rights
provision-fundamentally becomes state-level interior immigration
enforcement because of the disproportionate amount of civilly
detained immigrant parents kept in confinement over the fifteen-
month grace period. In other words, the ASFA's fifteen-month
trigger embodies the federal policy decision that a fifteen-month
absence makes a parent unfit for child rearing. For immigrant fami-
lies and noncitizen parents particularly, the constitutional protections
traditionally afforded by parental fitness hearings88 simply do not
apply. The ASFA, instead, turns out to be an outlandish and terrify-
ing means to deprive a cardinal liberty and privacy interest without
85 Many women serve an average of 18 months in prison. thus making them ripe
under ASFA to lose their parental rights. Jeremy Travis, Elizabeth Cincotta
McBride & Amy Solomon, Families Left Behind: The Hidden Costs of Incarcera-
tion and Reentry, URBAN INST. 1, 7 (revised June 2005), http://www.uiban.org/
UploadedPDF/310882 families left behind.pdf.
86 Adler, supra note 74, at 24-25.
87 Id.; Kennedy, supra note 11, at 79 ("Family law and policy are rooted in an
ideology that privileges one familial idea but excludes and marginalizes the many
other forms it can take.").
88 In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court discussed the importance of the "integrity of the
family unit" under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972). The Stanley court continued that "parents are constitutionally entitled
to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody."
Id. at 658; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (holding due process
of the Fourteenth Amendment demands that severance of parental rights from
natural children be held to standard of clear and convincing evidence).
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due process of law. This observation illustrates the uncertainty sur-
rounding the extent that parental rights to children, in mixed status
families, are matters of highest constitutional importance.8 9
The trend in evaluating the impact of the ASFA on immi-
grant families has culminated in various legal arguments that all
conform to the theme of preserving family normalcy. These argu-
ments take the following major forms: 1) greater state participation
through a higher standard of proof than traditionally employed in
termination of parental rights proceedings, 2) evaluation of eviden-
tiary standards in these termination proceedings, 3) recognition of a
right to counsel in these proceedings, 4) modification of or revoca-
tion of the ASFA, 5) or reformation of detention and incarceration
standards to promote normalcy through visitation, communication,
and contact between the immigrant parent and child.90 I seek to add
more dimension to this conversation: that for the ASFA to come
through on its mission to foster family permanency, there must be a
concession for the larger institutional problem that incarceration and
detention presumptively make a parent unfit; and in order to resolve
89 "[T]he interests of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently
fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 774 (Renquist, J., dissenting); see
also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1996) (articulating that a parent's
interest in maintaining parent-child relationship is an "important interest"). Whether
the fundamental right or interest vests through the liberty interest, privacy interest,
or both remains open-ended. For aught that appears, only fit parents have a right to
maintain a parent-child relationship, such that despite language referring to the
"right," it more practically appears to be treated as an "important interest." That
immigrant parents can have the liberty right "deprived" by the ASFA, for example,
lends credence that one must deserve or show affirmatively one's fitness as a parent
to preserve the parent-child relationship. This runs counter to constitutional
precepts that the state has the burden to prove unfitness by clear and convincing
evidence before it can interfere in a parent's child-rearing. See Santosky, 455 U.S.
at 747-48. The ASFA, if only by operation, essentially imposes the affirmative duty
on parents to maintain continuous contact with children and continuous possession
of good moral character. It can be seen as the state's imposition and judgment of
how parents should parent their children, which is certainly beyond the purview of
any state or the federal government.
90 See Kennedy, supra note 11, at 113-33. While Kennedy applies these proposals
broadly to any family affected by the ASFA and incarcerated parents particularly,
the arguments are gennane for immigrant families as well.
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this concern, the ASFA's fifteen-month trigger-for states to initiate
termination proceedings-must reflect and incorporate a greater role
for states and state discretion. The inquiry regarding unfitness must
go beyond the question of whether the parent is in detention. Yet, for
aught that appears, it simply is irrelevant that the detainee is or would
otherwise be a fit and effective parent, but for their term of incarcera-
tion or detention. Detention or incarceration, even alone, therefore
becomes dispositive of unfitness. 91
In order for this problem to be resolved, however, a meaning-
ful distinction must exist between incarceration and immigration
detention. This would effectuate an understanding that civil detention
is inherently different from penal incarceration, and similarly, that
illegal entrants are unlike felons. This delicate balancing must come
from the states: the ASFA must vest greater discretion to states to
proceed with termination hearings in the particular cases that warrant
state intervention. An absolute fifteen-month trigger requirement
naively produces a flat line rule in an area that demands particularity
and individualized facts and circumstances to matter. 92 The three
built-in exceptions in the statute to offset the fifteen-month trigger
simply do not account for immigrant parents' situations. Because
parents have an incredible interest in child rearing, the ASFA must
strike equilibrium between the permanency it seeks to promote and
the absurd deterioration it has effectuated against immigrant families.
Permitting states to review various cases at the fifteen-month trigger
before initiating termination proceedings presents a fair compromise
between the parental interest, federal interest, and state interest in
family law. Indeed, devolving this discretion to the states is consis-
91 This inference was noted by Hall: "some state courts... have erroneously assumed
a child's placement in foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months is
dispositive of unfitness, allowing ASFA to play a substantive, rather than
procedural, role in the termination process." C. Elizabeth Hall, Where Are My
Children... and My Rights?: Parental Rights Terminations as a Consequence of
Deportation, 60 DUKE L.J. 1459, 1469-70 (2011).
92 Phillip M. Genty, Moving Beyond Generalizations and Stereotypes to Develop
Individualized Approaches for Working Families Affected by Parental Incarcera-
tion, 50 FAm. CT. REV. 36, 37 (2012) (arguing for an individualized, qualitative
approach rather than a quantitative, categorical approach to speaking about the
needs of families).
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tent with the Tenth Amendment, where state authority remains com-
pelling in family and domestic relations. The ASFA, as it is now,
represents an over-inclusive exercise of federal oversight into state
discretion. Short of the ASFA returning to a preservation of the
family/reunification model over its current child safety/adoption
model, returning discretion to the states will allow a more holistic
examination of the needs of families and children without the arbi-
trary and untailored impact.
Thus, it is apparent that the immigration law canon is that
deprivation of children from the home and parental care constitutes
no due process violation of either parents' or children's rights, and
separate, rather than intact, families appear to be the norm. Immigra-
tion exceptionalism apparently justifies harsh outcomes that defeat
most notions of common decency. 93 The fact that immigrant children
may be citizens does not matter, and deportation of their parents does
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because the citizen
child's right is merely delayed, not curtailed or extinguished. 94 The
9' Immigration exceptionalism is common parlance to describe the impressive and
unique hold plenary power has over judicial review. See GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL
LAW 13 (1996) [hereinafter NEWMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION]; LucY
E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF
MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 245 (1995) (noting immigration law's estrangement
from public law generally); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-
BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 19 (1998) (critiquing
immigration as a legal "maverick" and "wild card").
9' See, e.g., Garcia v. Holder, 320 F. App'x 288, 290-91 (5th Cir. 2009) ("Though
his minor daughter is a United States citizen, her constitutional rights are not
affected by the deportation of [her] parent, even where her de facto deportation will
result.") (citing Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1969)); Gonzales-
Cuevas v. I.N.S., 515 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1975); see also David B. Thronson,
Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEv. L.J.
1165, 1194 (2006) [hereinafter Thronson, Choiceless Choices] (In the case of the
deportation of the noncitizen parent, the citizen child's removal from the U.S.
"merely postpone[s]" the child's right to remain in the U.S. until the child is old
enough to exercise that right (quoting Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d
Cir. 1977))); Lino A. Graglia, Birthright Citizenship for Children ofIllegal Aliens:
An Irrational Public Policy, 14 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3 (2009) (discussing anchor
baby myth and how illegal immigrant parents may use child as an excuse to
prolong U.S. stay, while also observing that deportation of illegal parent "would
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ASFA must be amended to incorporate parental fitness hearings that
carefully examine an individual person's merits and parenting capa-
cities. Within the judicial calculus, the length of detention alone
cannot automatically be the dispositive factor for parental unfitness,
and the state should be allowed, pursuant to an amendment of the
ASFA, to have prosecutorial discretion not to require termination
proceedings brought against fit parents. Not only does this conserve
scarce judicial resources, and promote efficiency and economy, but it
also allows states to dedicate their energies on high priority cases,
and, at the same time, recognizes the punitive realities and idiosyn-
crasies of immigration laws.
Put differently, immigrant parents have neither been proven
unfit nor should their legal status have any bearing on their fitness
determination. A return to normalcy, in spite of the parent's deten-
tion, must be cultivated, and detention as a consequence of one's
illegal entry, alone, without more, should not constitute a sufficient
basis for severance of parental rights. While the cause of the actual
termination is the parental failure to maintain ordinary contact and
care for the child, it is unrealistic for the government to assert such a
contention, as cause for termination, when they essentially set the
gears in motion for the doomsday clock. The ASFA, to exculpate
federal liability and responsibility, cannot simply force states to flip
the switch and expect states to account for alleviating the resulting
consequence of broken families. By comparison, the incarceration
rationale may be more convincing in the criminal context where
violent felonies committed by the adult parent more likely correlate
with a parent's actual unfitness. Illegal entry, by contrast, hardly rises
to the level of murder or robbery and seems to punish the immigrant
potentially deprive the child of the benefits of his or her American citizenship.");
Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the USA.: Children of Undocumented
Parents, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 35, 40-41 (1988) (stating that "citizen children
... have been unsuccessful in pressing the view that the deportation of their
undocumented parents is tantamount to the de facto deportation of the child."). But
see Edith Z. Friedler, From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference: United States
Deportation of Its Own Children, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 529 (1995)
(providing argument that government cannot deport the illegal alien parent of a
citizen child because this amounts to de facto deportation of the citizen child in
violation of the Constitution).
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parent for attempting to create a better life for the family. The inten-
tion and motivation for these acts are considerably different, yet the
effect of each on termination proceedings is identical.
Therefore, the question of permission and whether entry is
authorized-reflected in whether persons have valid immigration
status-has underscored the treatment and protections that should be
given to immigrant juveniles. It remains difficult to reconcile a non-
citizen parent's civil decision to cross the border with the termination
of parental rights proceedings that often follow if the parent is caught
by Customs and Border Control (CBP) or eventually by Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE). However unfair, what occurs is a
judicial codification that the immigrant juvenile's level of protection
parallels his or her parent's (meager) level of protection-that as far
as ability to stay in the U.S. goes, age and minority deserve little
evaluation despite what meaningful ties the child may have fostered
living in the U.S. with other family members or friends, who may
have citizenship status. 95 What is so unsatisfying is that no matter the
level of connection to U.S. soil, the degree of relationships cultivated
here, or the hardship in returning to foreign territory, what matters
most is the parental decision, in the first instance, to enter illegally. 96
95 What occurs, then, is that by virtue of jus soli, status is granted to the children,
but courts, by rejecting that de facto deportation is a violation of the child's
citizenship rights, effectively desire to impose ajus sanguinis construct in practice.
This occurs despite jus soli citizenship's ability to connect the child to the
community, while simultaneously giving significance to parents' past ties to the
U.S. and the child and family's prospective interest in creating bonds within the
U.S. See Hiroshi Motomura, We Askedfor Workers But Families Came: Time, Law
and the Family in Immigration and Citizenship, 14 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 103, 114
(2006).
96 The question of volition and decision to breach the border is of great significance
because the animosity against undocumented adult immigrants raises harrowing
questions of both national security and racism, especially in times of U.S. crisis. See
Ediberto Romdin, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMmIGR. L.J. 557, 561-62
(2006); see also Robert F. Ley, Reviving Rights of the Undocumented Through
Disparate Impact and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Problem with the FIL4,
§ 1981, & Preemption, 23 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 35 (2013) (for discussion of
troubling role alien intent and volition plays in the equal protection context). But for
a discussion of why expulsion of aliens is contrary and unsatisfying, the dissenting
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Illegal entry by a noncitizen parent, therefore, justifies the uprooting
of the citizen child and validates the disintegration of their emotional,
moral, and physical stability.97 The underlying theme is that adults'
rights prevail over children's rights irrespective of immigration
status. We observe, thus, that agency problems undergird surface
tensions in domestic juvenile law, but also in federal immigration
law. This troubling conclusion demonstrates the problematic state
that the Citizenship Clause98 has taken for unaccompanied minors.
The erosion of traditional protections of the Citizenship Clause
through the dumbing down of the (strongest) benefit of citizenship
status-the ability to meaningfully reside in the U.S. 99 renders the
Clause a nullity.100 This, to put it bluntly, is citizenship reductionism.
opinion of Justice Field in Ting v. United States, is elucidating. 149 U.S. 698, 750
(1889) (Field, J., dissenting). Therein, Justice Field eloquently affirms:
In no other instance, until the law before us was passed, has any public man had
the boldness to advocate the deportation of friendly aliens in time of peace. I
repeat the statement that in no other instance has the deportation of friendly
aliens been advocated as a lawful measure by any department of our government.
And it will surprise most people to learn that any such dangerous and despotic
power lies in our government,-a power which will authorize it to expel at
pleasure, in time of peace, the whole body of friendly foreigners of any country
domiciled herein by its permission; a power which can be brought into exercise
whenever it may suit the pleasure of congress, and be enforced without regard to
the guaranties of the constitution intended for the protection of the rights of all
persons in their liberty and property. Is it possible that congress can, at its
pleasure, in disregard of the guaranties of the constitution, expel at any time the
Irish, German, French, and English who may have taken up their residence here
on the invitation of the government, while we are at peace with the countries
from which they came, simply on the ground that they have not been naturalized?
Id.
97 Thronson, Of Boarders and Best Interests, supra note 72, at 52 (noting that the
undocumented population lacks stability and prospects for legalization).
9' The Citizenship Clause reads "[A]l persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Birthright
citizenship is also codified. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2012) ("The following shall be
nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.").
99 Most notable benefits of citizenship include the right to not be deported, the right
to vote, see Ron Hayduk, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING
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IV. MIXED-STATUS FAMILIES AND THE
CITIZEN-BENEFITS QUESTION PRESENTS
A CHALLENGE FOR CITIZENSHIP: BIRTH-
RIGHT CITIZENSHIP REDUCTIONISM AND
THE SOLUTION OF AGGRESSIVE
ATTENDANT BENEFITS
The face of immigration is hard to define. The "other" is
easily viewed as excludable and foreign, 10 1 but the inner face of
immigration masks more difficult issues, and upon further introspec-
tion, it becomes clear that the "foreigner" establishes a family, com-
munity ties, and a parent-child relationship, which we perceive as
institutionally valuable. Unfortunately, fiscal encroachment often
overwhelms and underscores how a nation is defined. 10 2 Financial
RIGHTS IN THE U.S. (2006); Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are The People": Alien
Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992);
Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and
Theoretical Meanings ofAlien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1391 (1993); Gerald
M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1092 (1977), and ability to mn for public office.
100 Such an argument is in stark contrast to prevailing academic acceptance of
birthright citizenship as a positive force of integration offsetting harsh immigration
restrictionism. See Gerald L. Neuman, supra note 93, at 166 (1996); Nicole New-
man, supra note 14, at 480 ("The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
merely serves as a backdrop, preventing the creation of a permanent subclass of
people and children who would have no other route to legalized status."). In
Newman's analysis and as promoted by many other scholars, the Citizenship
Clause has been a champion for immigrants' rights because it confers automatic
citizenship, a small benefit when compared to the labyrinthian immigration system.
101 See Lindsay, supra note 56, at 8 (noting that the foreignness of the immigrant
came to dictate immigration power itself, as "source, locus, and scope of
Congress's regulatory authority," thus coming to conclusion of the immigrant as a
distinct, legal construct).
102 See Michael Robert W. Houston, Birthright Citizenship in the United Kingdom
and the United States: A Comparative Analysis of the Common Law Basis for
Granting Citizenship to Children Born of Illegal Immigrants, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 693, 724 (2000) ("illegal immigrants are a net cost to the United
States-a product of dissatisfaction with receipt of social welfare benefits by illegal
immigrants and failure of adequate border control...").
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impact and resource allocation have come to define the core of immi-
gration policy as distributional restrictionism; that is, the immigration
laws of admission and exclusion, and ultimately of national self-
determination, are also influenced by the ebb and flow of whom we
confer benefits and rights and whom we deprive of such rights.
103
This rights dialectic is thus indispensable to the citizenship conun-
drum. I therefore aim in this section to demonstrate that the problem
of citizenship reductionism or dilution can be remedied through the
promotion of aggressive attendant benefits to citizenship that
promote assimilation, commitment to the U.S. national identity, and
increase the inherent value of citizenship.
But before that analysis, it is important to note Professor
Spiro's contribution to the scholarship on citizenship dilution. By
characterizing the immigration influx as deleterious and uncontrolled
and the conferral of citizenship as too inclusive and expansive,
10 4
Spiro situates his radical analysis of citizenship dilution in the recent
international disorientation with the U.S. and the spread of citizen-
ship status abroad as diminishing its worth at home. 10 5 In propa-
gating that citizenship is on the decline, he grounds his thinking on
the particular disconnect between receiving the status and the status's
indications of any actual dedication to U.S. soul.10 6 Inexorably, Spiro
professes that the arbitrary nature of the granting of citizenship, as
irrelevant to actually sustained ties in the U.S., is troubling. 10 7 This
leads him to conclude that the more the U.S. becomes inclusive, the
importance of citizenship vanishes, the identity of the U.S. weakens,
103 For a discussion of citizenship's impact on distributional justice, see Ayelet
Shachar, Children of a Lesser State: Sustaining Global Inequality Through
Citizenship Laws, in NOMOS: CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 382 (Stephen Macedo
& Iris Marion Young eds., 2003) (for recognition of citizenship as a property right
"subject to the arguments of distributive justice"); see also Aihwa Ong, FLEXIBLE
CITIZENSHIP: THE CULTURAL LOGICS OF TRANSNATIONALITY 4 (1999) (noting that
traditional focus of citizenship's legal impact obscures democratic citizenship's
distributive effect on citizens).
104 PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZA-
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and the traditional benefits attached to citizenship become less
meaningful, since non-citizens possess many of those similar benefits
of citizenship. 10 8 While Spiro's arguments are laced with ideals of
American exceptionalism and the definitional importance of exclu-
sivity in citizenship and nationhood, his contention that there is no
incentive to citizenship is much harder to digest. Spiro holds that the
feasibility of obtaining citizenship combined with the decrease in
discriminatory means to control immigrants implicates that the
benefits non-citizens receive are indistinguishable from those citizens
receive, such that there is no incentive to seek the status.109
To lay the groundwork, it is crucial to note that the meaning
and substance of citizenship has undergone a paradigmatic shift since
the late nineteenth century.' 10 Who we admit is no longer necessarily
related to the question of (financial, labor, or social) benefits, or of
association with the nation. Instead, the "right" of citizenship at birth
has become increasingly nebulous, 1 decreasingly national in
108 Id.
109 Spiro, supra note 53, at 91, 95-97.
110 Traditionally, the literature on citizenship has converged over the national
quality of the citizenship-immigration relationship and its polarizing and exclusive
ability to shape nations and demographics. See Peter H. Schuck, supra note 93, at
48 (discussing national fervor and values as carrying the day over "the earlier
individualistic ideology of traditional liberalism"); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century
Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1, 263 (2002)
(asserting that "racist and nationalistic views of the day go far in explaining the
substantive outcomes reached in the inherent powers decisions").
1 Indeed, citizenship escapes a cohesive definition. See Audrey Macklin, Who is
The Citizen's Other? Considering The Heft of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 333, 333 (2007) (stating that "Citizenship as an analytic category is
remarkably capacious... Citizenship describes status, rights, practices and
performances."); Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in
an Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11, 20-34 (2006) (asserting an external
citizenship perception that still recognizes citizenship as legal status and as
practiced identity); Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 447, 450, 455 (2000) (arguing that citizenship has taken at least four
different understandings: "as legal status, " "as rights," " as political activity," and
"as a form of collective identity and sentiment"); CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 9 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer
eds., 2001) ("No single definition can adequately capture the complex,
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character, and progressively more individual and personal. The
nature of citizenship is transforming from purely being a national,
community-defining value towards a personal, self-organizing prin-
ciple, originating with the atomized family unit.112 Who a person is
as "citizen" becomes a personal component of that individual's
identity, and upon assumption of citizenship, one comports and
integrates with the values and behaviors coveted by the existing
national community. 113 For many immigrants, the issue of citizen-
ship is not national, but intrinsically individual and a personal goal or
aspiration with tremendous implications for family structure and
growth. The family as an organizing principle influences whether
one traverses borders or complies with laws, whether one becomes a
citizen or retains vagrant and wayward behaviors. It guides moral
behavior and prompts accountability and American values. In other
words, a family-centric immigration system provides tremendous
normative and practical advantages over individual-petitioner orien-
ted systems, 114 and citizenship is becoming extremely beneficial in
that family immigration dialogue.
multidimensional character of citizenship as a general legal status, unitary
institution, or fixed, delineated sets of practices.").
112 By this, I do not argue that there must be individual assessments of the
innumerable permutations immigrant and mixed-status families can take. Rather, it
is far more instructive to examine citizenship from the lense of family and other
principles or institutions that offer a self-organizing value. Families, not indivi-
duals, immigrate, so the perspective from which we evaluate citizenship benefits
and confer them, must adequately address that the family is a nucleus for why we
grant the right in the first instance. In this vein, discussing citizenship without also
distilling the right's impact on the family, leads to an imprecise and hostile
language. We must develop the proper language, that is, the proper equipment,
before we can critically explore and lucidly assess the dialogue of citizenship.
113 jar.
114 This observation is also evident in Motomura, supra note 95, at 117-18 (arguing
that "Immigration as transition suggests that immigration and citizenship law
should take into account, not only by recognizing existing ties, but also by
promoting immigrant family life..."). Ironically, the petition-based immigration
system currently in place, with all its preferences and quotas, was meant to promote
family unity. See Developments in the Law: Immigration Policy and the Rights of
Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1351 (1983), (citing S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 13 (1965)), reprinted in, 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3328,
3332.
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As a result, citizenship discourse has experienced a scholastic
revolution away from addressing citizenship critiques merely
through the lenses of nationalism, racism, or nativism, but now also,
and most notably, through flexible personal structures and obliga-
tions, institutional obstructions and hindrances, and unintended
consequences of U.S. policy shortcomings. Rather than examining
citizenship through only the lens of immigration by questioning who
may enter and what their admission means for the polity, the shift in
focus demonstrates the inclination to address the polity's likewise
similar impact on highly sensitive and susceptible communities. 115 It
115 Such an argument for a family-focused dialogue for citizenship, that is, a
language for the intersection of immigration, family, and citizenship law together,
has rarely been discussed. This "trifecta" has received only limited attention. See
Motomura, supra note 95, at 103; David B. Thronson, Custody and Contradictions:
Exploring Immigration Law as Federal Family Law in the Context of Child
Custody, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 453, 509-13 (2008); Victoria Degtyareva, Note,
Defining Family in Immigration Law: Accounting for Nontraditional Families in
Citizenship By Descent, 120 YALE L.J. 862 (2011); see also Bernard Friedland &
Valerie Epps, The Changing Family and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Impact of
Medical Reproductive Technology on the Immigration and Nationality Act's
Definition of the Family, 11 GEO. IMIGR. L.J. 429, 443 (1997) (discussing
immigration's inability to recognize nontraditional families). In his account,
Motomura appropriately observes that any consensus on the role of the family in
immigration and citizenship law is elusive, for any "convenient temptation to think
about immigrants as individuals is tempered by the reality of the family." Id. He
then reiterates that "[f]amilies can provide the social and economic support [that is]
crucial for 'integration' into the receiving society and immigrants without families
"tend to remain sojourners [who] never consider themselves permanent residents or
potential citizens." Id. (quoting earlier article, Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and
Immigration: A Roadmap for the Ruritanian Lawmaker, 43 AM. J. CoMP. L. 511,
543 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). These sentiments remain alive and
viable, even now, but I repeat it here to juxtapose my point that family, in the
context of citizenship law, poses an inherent challenge: the family unit is both
necessary for survival and integration, as Motomura explains, but at the same time
represents a vehicle for the dumbing down of the right-what I coin as citizenship
reductionism.
Thus, the family-based citizenship dialogue must continue in order to
espouse a language and discourse that respects the role and significance of the
family unit. Doing so respects what Motomura describes as a "prospective sense of
time" that "focuses on the immigrants' future lives in the United States," coming
eventually toward "a more instrumental view of the family in immigration and
Critiquing Birthright Citizenship
is crucial, then, that citizenship should and must develop to keep
pace with the parallel needs of the children and incidental families to
whom the status is conferred. What must happen, therefore, is an
internalization of the maxim "citizenship matters ' 16 into our dis-
course on both immigration and family law. In order to effectuate
such a mandate, citizenship, as aforementioned, must consider a
family-centric element into its language. Even more importantly, it
must divest itself of the understanding that it is merely a legal status
encompassing the ability to integrate and socialize a nation into a
community. 117 Policy makers must evaluate the primordial question
citizenship." Id. at 114. By contrast, the intersection between the family law and
immigration (and overlooking citizenship) has come under considerable scholarly
attention, particularly in areas of deportation, detention conditions, and best interest
of the child arguments. See Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western
Democracies Value Family and Marriage? Immigration Law's Conflicted Answer,
32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 273, 26 (2003) ("Much of the analysis of immigration law
tends to focus on how immigration rles regulate and channel immigration of
individuals, rather than on the impact they have on migration of families and
couples."); Yahner, supra note 78, at 783-789; Julia Halloran McLaughlin, supra
note 36. Again, the tripartite intersection between citizenship, family, and
immigration has rarely been addressed, but is slowly gaining recent attention, and I
hope to prompt more discussion with this article.
116 See Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution,
and Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEo. IMMiGR. L.J.
667, 667 (1995).
117 Id. (noting that importance of citizenship "does not lie exclusively in a
delineation of rights, whereby citizens receive an abundance of protections not
afforded to noncitizens" but that citizenship is a broader concept). Indeed, while
citizenship does not expressly confer a set of rights, the rights it does confer offer
little in the way of incorporation or resolving the family dilemma. It is my
contention that an essentialist understanding of citizenship as mere status, even one
with the capacity to integrate outsiders, misses the mark. My qualm with citizenship
benefits, as they stand now, is that these attendant benefits do not push the envelope
or promote integration, as scholars may suggest. It is certainly true that the right to
not be deported is a crucial benefit of citizenship, and arguably the strongest
benefit. See Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J.
INT'L L. 694, 695 (2011) (noting that "trends reflect a reconsideration of citizenship
status, shifting from an identity to a rights frame"). But without benefits (to follow
from citizenship) that attend to the incompatibility of the family unit with
immigration law, the actual citizenship status becomes much less effective in its
ability to ameliorate draconian consequences or mitigate complications of mixed-
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of what rights citizenship should confer, and the proper answer must
inevitably be that these "benefits" should aide in incorporation and
integration of that citizen into society, with the goal of establishing
the citizen (and particularly U.S.-born immigrant children) within the
valued institution of the family.18
This solution is quite attractive for both non-citizens and
current citizens, who would otherwise be reluctant to embrace addi-
tional members, because such immigrants appear un-assimilable or
distant. Therefore, I reprimand the current attendant benefits of citi-
zenship as not necessarily meaningless, as more radical theorists like
Professor Spiro may suggest, but as failing to push the envelope of
political integration sufficiently to overcome the shadow and mysti-
cism that surrounds who these non-citizens are. In other words, the
reason immigrants remain disenfranchised, unable to assimilate,
culturally non-American, and a second tier shadow population is that
attendant rights and benefits, that currently attach to citizenship, do
not provide them the social acuity to meaningfully incorporate
themselves. In order to foster the desired incorporation of immigrants
status families and separated families. See Janet M. Calvo, Alien Status Restrictions
on Eligibility for Federally Funded Assistance Programs, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 395 (1988); Peter L. Reich, Jurisprudential Tradition and Undocu-
mented Alien Entitlements, 6 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1992) (arguing expanding
benefits to even undocumented persons). The benefits of citizenship are estranged
from healing or mending structural family problems of immigrant families.
Citizenship simply must develop on par with the needs of those who possess it. We
frequently emphasize the period of residence, the sense of time, and community
connections people have as an indicator of their intent and commitment to
permanent residence. The establishment of a fully citizen family, inevitably slowly
through mixed-status ones, is an analog of that community attachment. While
certainly it can be construed as a circumvention of immigration laws, many
immigrants attempt to regularize their status and those of others who join them in
the family unit. The family becomes an expression of long-term community
attachment and should come to define the "face" of citizenship, for the argument is
quite appealing that family, in some form, should be an attendant benefit of
citizenship. See infra Part V.
118 Among the many models proposed for the integration of immigrants as full
agents and political participants, Motomura's classic self-definition model centered
on immigrants' rights remains quintessential. See Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien
Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1927,
1944-52 (1996).
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as national members, the benefits of citizenship must naturally
mature to more than they are now. While this may be viewed as an
enlargement of citizenship rights, it can also be seen as a different
methodological approach to selecting which rights and benefits
immigrants should receive. Rather than conferring more rights to
immigrants, we should be granting those rights that permit immi-
grants to assimilate and contribute to the national dialogue, thus
assuaging concerns that immigrants cannot be "American" and
simultaneously providing them with self-reinforcing tools and values
to disseminate to their own U.S.-born children. If we want citi-
zenship to matter once more, the way the status confers benefits and
the reasons why such rights are conferred in the first instance must be
critically evaluated.
Indeed, it defies logic that current attendant benefits of citi-
zenship status fail to aggressively incorporate immigrants. If citi-
zenship is to have continuing validity and if immigrants are to be
truly vested in the national stage, benefits that matter must matter.
The greatest problem with the ambiguities in citizenship discourse is
that children continue to find themselves in precarious and inequit-
able positions and who must ultimately pay the severe price of our
institutional and integrative failures. Thus, both the concept of
birthright citizenship and its attendant benefits must be modernized
to address the realities of the people to whom the status extends and
matter most: those who are at the borders of the law. 119 Only then
119 Surely, the safe space of the family must be carved out and delineated amidst the
"playground of citizenship." Ratna Kapur, The Citizen and the Migrant. Post-
colonial Anxieties, Law, and the Politics of ExclusionInclusion, 8 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 537, 568 (2007); see also WILLIAM FLORES & RINA BENMAYOR,
LATINO CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: CLAIMING IDENTITY, SPACE, AND RIGHTS 15
(1997) (for conceptualization of cultural citizenship, as opposed to legal citizenship,
that allows minorities to carve out space spaces for themselves when in foreign
territory subject to native hostility). This safe space, from my own perspective,
must be the support network comprising the family unit.
Perhaps assimilation of immigrants is so stunted because of current
immigration's failure to adequately recognize the institution of the family unit.
There is some logic to the point that an immigrant alone in the U.S. is less likely to
assimilate without the support of others (i.e. family). The family, therefore, can
itself be a means of incorporation and integration into the political and economic
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can we genuinely achieve a modem citizenship discourse that critic-
ally engages the dynamic nature of legal status for the immigrant and
child.
To place this argument in context, it is central to address
itself the state of citizenship status between the immigrant parent and
child in these mixed-status families. 120 Despite legal status afforded
U.S.-born children, it appears that, functionally, the parent's illegal
status determines the child's "citizenship" status, such that the power
of citizenship has diminished. This dumbing down of citizenship can
be better understood by analyzing the primary question: "[i]s a
parent's alien status, legal or illegal, a factor as to whether citizenship
can inhere in a child born in the United States of such parents?"
' 121
As Professor Houston accurately discerns, the doctrine whereby
parents "provisionally stand in the shoes of their children, such that
their illegal status is transferred to the child" contradicts Plyler v.
mechanisms of a nation. I do admit that this solution suffers from the problem of
visibility, that is, the greater the family and support, the more visible immigrant
status can be (possibly due to race, among other indicators), and therefore, the
greater the backlash in retort. In any event, social visibility forces recognition of the
reality of the family unit's special significance in immigration and citizenship law
that should not go unnoticed merely because of the unpleasant realities of U.S. law.
In one interpretation. the need for family support in the U.S. is a result of the
intense antagonism that undergirds not only facially neutral discriminatory laws but
also the way we allocate resources and time. If solo immigrants require support in
order to survive within our borders, then our melting pot culture has certainly fallen
into disrepute. Awkwardly, in order to become citizens, immigrants must divorce
themselves from their family. It is unacceptable for immigration and citizenship
discourse to fail to consider the role of the family in that dialogue.
120 See Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55
UCLA L. REv. 1161, 1161-62 (2008) (launching discussion of "context-based
theory of citizenship," and the interdisciplinary advantages that context-based
approaches have for persons whose identities intersect with multiple modes of
being); Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap
Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2493 (2007). It
can be said that my own analysis here contextualizes traditional theories of
citizenship with the lived experiences of the family unit.
121 Houston, supra note 102, at 718.
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Doe. 122 Since Plyler has legitimized immigrant children as a suspect
class worthy of strict judicial review, the notion of parental rights
vis-a-vis their immigrant children is diminished. In other words,
because of the troubling dichotomy in Plyler, that undocumented
children are suspect but adult undocumented persons are not, consti-
tutional protections for the children may come at the price of similar
protections for immigrant parents. 123 It is doubtful that courts will
respect both undocumented children and undocumented parents as
similarly situated or deserving of the same level of constitutional
scrutiny. Moreover, it is impossible to have the citizenship rights of
the undocumented immigrant child develop stably alongside undocu-
mented parents' rights. This is so problematic for the immigrant child
because the adult immigrant parent must be the responsible care-
taker, and absent comparable due process protections developing
proportionately and in conjunction with children's due process rights,
children will continually be in a place of constitutional superiority,
but are unlikely to exercise their rights or fully explore their protec-
tions without analogous recognition for parents.
What this conflict demonstrates, however, is that the concept
of imputed or transferred status 124 plays out differently in the realm of
equal protection (and thus access to important fundamental interests)
than it does for the even more basic formulation of U.S. residency and
122 457 U.S. 202 (1981) (finding that the children of undocumented immigrants
should not be punished for their parents' illegal entry by depriving them of free
public school education); see Houston, supra note 102, at 718 n. 151.
123 It is difficult to foresee how adult undocumented immigrants can receive rights
in tandem with undocumented immigrant children when this case remains a legal
barrier to the former group. See Ley, supra note 96 (for a fuller discussion of the
volatility of the Plyler decision to alienage as a suspect class). If anything, it is
possible that adult undocumented immigrants can slowly receive heightened
judicial review as plenary power softens and as rigorous scrutiny increases. But
expansion of such higher review remains consumed by the fact that despite recent
findings in the area of indefinite detentions, see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001), courts seem unwilling to dole out protection for undocumented adults
generally or abandon plenary power any time soon. But see Spiro, supra note 53, at
339-40 (noting that the Zadvyas case and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001),
exemplify the weakening grip of plenary power).
124 See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 94-96 (1985).
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family unification. 125 Thus, we are more willing to impute the
parent's illegal status to the citizen child when considering
petitioning-ability or family structure. 126 By contrast, the citizen child
is likely to be valued as a citizen and worthy of heightened constitu-
tional review (and is therefore not punished for the parents' illegal
entry) when access to a benefit, such as education, is the issue.127 This
disorientation makes little sense. In the area of education, children are
valued citizens in need of integrative services, but as children "alone,"
they are not similarly appreciated and are therefore viewed as
illegal. 128 This conflict is a testament to the fact that immigrant
children simply cannot be divorced from their parents' decisions. The
critical takeaway is that the parent-child relationship in immigration
law is not a valued association to the extent it is in domestic juvenile
law, because the parents' status is the only one of consequence.129
125 This conclusion is extended to the structure of the immigration laws generally.
See Thronson, Here from Here, supra note 17, at 69 (discussing that family
integrity is often ignored because immigration laws only permit parents to align the
child's status with their own).
126 See Sara Catherine Barnhart, Second Class Delivery: The Elimination of
Birthright Citizenship as a Repeal of "The Pursuit of Happiness," 42 GA. L. REv.
525, 560-61 (2008) (discussing that immigrant children would probably endure
similar exploitation as their illegal parents); see also The Constitutional
Implications of H.R. 705, H.R. 1363, and Other Proposals to Amend the
Citizenship Laws: Hearing Before the H. Com. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Immigration and Claims & Subcomm. on the Constitution, 104th Cong. 9 (1995)
(statement by Gerald L. Neuman, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School), for
proposition that current trend is to exclude illegal aliens from benefits and services
generally available to others.
127 See Barnhart, supra note 126, at 560 (finding that even without birthright
citizenship, the Supreme Court will likely still provide government education to
children of undocumented immigrants); Ley, supra note 96, at 64.
12' Houston has come close to this conclusion. See Houston, supra note 94, at 722
("Caselaw does not require formal consent by the United States to the parent's
presence in order for children of illegal immigrants to be recognized as citizens.
Neither, however, does the case law definitely state the converse proposition -that
these children are, in fact, citizens.").
129 Valerie Leiter, Jennifer Lutzy McDonald & Heather T. Jacobson, Challenges to
Children's Independent Citizenship: Immigration, Family and the State, 13
CHILDHOOD 11, 20 (2006) ("While all citizen children have the same formal rights
to social benefits, informally parents and street-level bureaucrats who implement
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Most notably, this conflict demonstrates that we are more amenable to
accommodating the fiscal impact of immigrants than prevailing anti-
immigrant political sentiment may dictate. That the Plyler court found
children of undocumented parents worthy of state funding for
education illustrates that what clearly divides the national community
is what level of respect we should accord the petitioning ability of a
U.S.-born immigrant child. That such children can have the eventual
ability to incorporate persons into the U.S. is what I identify as
delayed participation or the deferred agency problem. In other words,
immigrant children do not become full agents, and thus full members
of society, until they can either petition for others or meaningfully
self-petition themselves. What this reinforces is the chronic inability
of immigrant children to be independent rights-holders. Their
existence, instead, is tied to the family unit or primary caretaker until
they reach the age of majority and cease to be children. This brazen
aspect of immigration law translates to the indefensibility of any
child-directed approach in immigration law,130 for the dependency
construction of childhood constricts so pervasively in the statutory,
constitutional, and systematic framework. More importantly, this
observation manifests a remarkable inference. Because agency does
not ripen until the immigrant child matures, the project of national
self-definition appears to ferment only in adults. In other words, the
opinion of adults concerning who is admitted, excluded, or deported
is the only opinion that is reflected in the nation's growth and
valuation.
public policy at the ground level may believe that parents' citizenship statuses
eclipse children's individual citizenship, and may act on those beliefs."), available
at http://chd.sagepub.com/content/13/1/11.full.pdf.
13' Because of the anchor baby conundrum, it seems quite impossible to fathom a
system where children are fully embodied, self-petitioning individuals. A child-
centered immigration system would appear to create an open-door policy. One
possible imagination for a child-centered immigration system would be to impose
harsh exterior enforcement, so as to increase the set of rights and benefits available
to those inside. Protecting immigrant minors and preserving family unity comes at
the cost of considerable expenses at the border and for U.S. citizens. We are, in a
sense, breaking the bank when we open the contours of citizenship, even when we
may not be opening the borders.
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Accordingly, this indicates that American adult citizens, and
possibly also legally permanent residents, have strong affinities
toward who should and should not be part of the nation. The
discussion, therefore, regarding transferred illegal parental status to
citizen children, actually reveals the more fundamental stricture: that
the American people are willing to assume a financial burden to
support a segment of the undocumented population if it means pre-
serving their ability to define the national contours, both literally
through border enforcement but also metaphorically, through how
we want people entering and legalizing themselves as citizens. 131
These tensions exemplify the grave extent to which many citizens
have problems with the current petition-based immigration unifica-
tion system. In many ways, who we admit or exclude is a political
question, and one that has taken astonishingly critical social and
ideological importance, such that the issue has assumed politico-
constitutional prominence. 132 The unfortunate consequence is that
immigrant children have become "illegal citizens."' 133 They are
131 This observation likely stems from the community's acceptance of immigrants'
contributions to the U.S. economy. See Barry, supra note 111, at 51 ("But even
though [the immigrants] economic engagement is welcome (and may even be
framed as constitutive of their status as citizens), their direct participation in the
national political community generally is not"); see also Ley, supra note 96 (for
notion that citizens are receptive to taking a fiscal hit if it meant ideological
exclusion of a disfavored group, namely illegal immigrants from particular states).
132 See Patrick J. Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of
Ideological Exclusions: An Historical Perspective, 15 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 61, 66
(2010) ("It is an issue that can only be placed into this nation's political discourse,
where it has always and rightfully been."). But see Proposed Legislation to Deny
Citizenship at Birth to Certain Children Born in the United States: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, 105th
Cong. 10 24-25 (1997) (statement of Dawn E. Johnsen, Acting Assistant Att'y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice) (stating that in response to the
Dred Scott decision, "[iln rebuilding our nation after [the Civil] [W]ar, we pledged
that we should never again trust to judges or politicians the power to deprive from a
class born on our soil the right to citizenship"). Such legislative history validates
that Congress intended citizenship rights be granted through Constitutional
amendment, rather than through statute that could thereafter be more feasibly
reversed by Congress.
133 See Barnhart, supra note 126, at 560-61 (raising that the deprivation of benefits
and services to adult undocumented aliens appears justifiable, but denying such
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"illegal" and must return with their undocumented parents to their
countries of origin notwithstanding their citizenship at birth. Their
lack of agency and dependency on their parents render their citizen-
ship functionally null and void. If immigration enforcement increases
and the scope of citizenship continues to be curtailed by unpredict-
able judicial reasoning, the reality will be that children exist without
families, that the cost of preserving citizenship implies a sacrifice of
the most fundamental form of relationality, association, and attach-
ment. It is disconcerting when a nation's laws force children into
deciding between being citizens or being sons and daughters.
It is even more disturbing that lack of status can compromise
a seemingly fundamental interest in the parent-child relationship,
such compromise not being defensible absent a fitness hearing for
citizen parents. Indeed, ordinarily, the state has a burden of proving
parental unfitness before it can intervene into the private sphere of
the parent-child relationship: "We have little doubt that the Due
Process Clause would be offended '[i]f a State were to attempt to
force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the
parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for
the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best
interest." 134 What is not as clear, however, is that our laws distin-
guish, and thus discriminate, between different forms of the ideal
family unit-being part of a "mixed-status immigrant family" is a
euphemism for a dysfunctional family. Framed as whether lack of
immigration status has any bearing on parental fitness, the clear
answer is it certainly does, but should not. The fact that lack of legal
status acts as a presumption of parental unfitness for immigrant
families 135 is a troubling reality in the U.S. legal landscape that
access to children seems harsh and unpalatable, and that doing so would brand
them as illegal and condemn them to inescapable poverty).
134 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring); see, e.g., Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1932).
135 Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc.
JUST. 63, 82 (2012) (citing In re MM., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003))
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reflects not only our normative presumptions of race, nationality,
culture, and ethnicity, but our assumptions regarding what benefits
citizenship should confer and how we should define "citizen" in the
first instance. 136 Professor Zug has properly observed that "these
cases raise questions about the very meaning and purpose of citizen-
ship in a liberal state" such that "the state's interest in citizen children
far exceeds the state's interest in their noncitizen parents."
137
The connection, rarely drawn however, is that the destruction
of immigrant families and the declension of constitutional family law
principles to the parent-immigrant child relationship is the result of
our conflicting premises regarding how noncitizen children should be
(discussing juvenile court termination of parental rights based on parent's
immigration status).
136 See William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22
GEo. IMmiGR. L.J. 221, 253-57 (2008) (for one imagination of citizenship discourse
as the "principled relation with the nation and citizenly" reflecting notions of
reciprocity, fairness, and selflessness). Needless to say, there have been countless
re-envisionings of how birthright citizenship should be construed: from rejections
ofjus soli toward jus sanguinis citizenship and even membership-oriented critiques.
See Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immi-
grants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 389-90 (2007) ("rights and recognition
should extend to all persons who are territorially present within the geographical
space of a national state by virtue of that presence"); Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion
and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker under United
States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 955 (1988); Linda Bosniak, Membership, Equality,
and the Difference ThatAlienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1137-45 (1994)
(articulating different range of models for granting rights based on minimalistic
versus expansive understandings of membership, territorial personhood, and
community). What is essential to note, however, is the underlying message: that
only citizens are fit parents and that only citizens deserve intact families. Thus, one
"benefit" of citizenship is the ability to maintain a normal parent-child relationship,
but even this once settled contention is dubious given citizenship reductionism.
Society has shaped the lack of legal status to mean that the undocumented family is
a lesser mode of being than the citizen family, with mixed status families in a
nebulous in-between.
137 Marcia Zug, Should I Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigrant Reunification
Decisions Should Be Based on the Best Interests of the Child, 2011 BYU L. REv.
1139, 1142-43 (2011) (citing James Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State,
Parentage, and the Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REv. 755, 762-66
(2009)) (noting the state's essential involvement in formation of all parent-child
relationships).
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treated socially and legally. 138 Efforts to address the lack of constitu-
tional protections for immigrant families must also address the
difficult assumptions we have about noncitizen children, the role
they play vis-a-vis their noncitizen parents, and the state of judicial
protection and level of scrutiny for both immigrants and children. 
139
The immigrant child is a special creature within constitutional juris-
prudence, drawing from immigration, where they receive fewer pro-
tections, and from juvenile law, where they are afforded stronger due
process rights. The two distinct fields and intersection between this
duality reveals that immigrant children, all too often, fall through the
cracks. The duality is further intersected by the citizenship mode of
being, and despite the "protection" of that status, the immigration
dimension frequently overrides concerns for the child.140 This
138 Indeed, "critics of conferring territorial birthright citizenship are generally
criticizing U.S. policy decisions directed at immigration and social services, not the
children themselves." Houston, supra note 102, at 726. The underlying problem
thus becomes how to properly protect the citizenship rights of U.S.-born children
while protecting the integrity of immigration laws and deterring or dis-incentivizing
illegal entry by immigrant parents. See Patrick J. Charles, Decoding the Fourteenth
Amendment's Citizenship Clause: Unlawful Immigrants, Allegiance, Personal
Subjection, and the Law, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 255 (2012) (questioning the
effectiveness of federal law to solve the illegal immigration dilemma and preserve
political institutions). The likely response is that these laudable goals cannot be
accomplished without destroying the parent-child relationship-the immigration
tradition remains incompatible with juggling the rights of (citizen) immigrant
juveniles, on the one hand, and rights of the nation, fellow citizens, and parents on
the other. The parent-child animosity in immigration is even stronger and poses an
even greater conflict of interest than can be imagined. See Linda Kelly Hill, The
Right to Know Your Rights: Conflict of Interest and the Assistance of Unaccom-
panied Alien Children, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 263, 302-08 (2010)
(providing critique of Legal Orientation Program as conflicted).
139 But see Motomura, supra note 95, at 1626-28, who avoids this difficult question
by proposing that courts need not grapple with such normative inquiries, since they
nevertheless can infuse constitutional rights through procedural due process or
other forms of non-substantive review.
140 The child certainly lacks agency and a voice in immigration. All the actors
(scared parent, prosecutorial government, and "impartial" immigration court)
seemingly should protect the child's interest, but cannot because of a conflict of
interest and diverse roles they must occupy relative to the child. This leads to
"limit[ing] the use of children and their interests as organizing forces in family
immigration." Thronson, Herefrom Here, supra note 17, at 69.
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conclusion demonstrates that federal immigration regulation is
parent-focused where it should instead reflect the reality that immi-
grants traverse borders as families, not individuals, and that the
parent's decision to enter bears no indicia of unfitness.
Indeed, the image of the immigrant child as a ward of the
state, upon exercise of citizenship to remain in the U.S., itself raises
deep questions. 14 1 Insofar as the consequences of our immigration
regime tears apart immigrant families, there is an underlying problem
that requires examination: the dumbing down of the concept of
birthright citizenship, what I previously described as citizenship
reductionism. 142 In this area, it appears that birthright citizenship of
immigrant minors yields to immigration policy.1 43 While birthright
141 Schuck & Smith, supra note 124, at 4 (increase in illegal immigration and rise of
the welfare state "raise profound questions about distributional justice, national
autonomy, and political community in contemporary American life").
142 The Supreme Court has read the Citizenship Clause as accepting jus soli
citizenship, first enunciated in Calvin's Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.), over
jus sanguinis citizenship arguments. United States v. Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
(declaring birthright citizenship for all U.S.-born children of noncitizens, except for
children of diplomats as immune from U.S. law and children of a hostile occupying
force in the United States). What I imply by this concept of citizenship reduction-
ism is that the immigrant citizen child's rights, are-in effect-actually reduced,
such that there is a devaluation of not only the right, but of the "belonging" of the
citizen child as well in our nation.
113 But see Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Policing the Borders of Birthright Citizenship:
Some Thoughts on the New (and Old) Restrictionism, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 311, 313
(2012) (providing thoughtful analysis that "it has been immigration policy, not
birthright citizenship, that has ultimately yielded" and which has mitigated
historical effects of exclusionary and discriminatory immigration laws).
While birthright citizenship has ameliorated the effects of harsh immi-
gration law, it has not resolved the problem of family separation espoused by
immigration laws, nor do I assert that it necessarily should. Rather, what must be
addressed is the broader question of whether birthright citizenship, and therefore
citizen children's rights generally, are being curtailed by the plenary power doctrine
itself; it appears that they are. Citizenship arguments, as a means toward effectu-
ating rights for immigrant children, remain extremely conflicted by the anchor baby
problem and the politicized nature of the myth. But perhaps proponents of
birthright citizenship, moving forward, can endorse a view that the Citizenship
Clause provides an avenue for affirmative immigrant children's rights if properly
contextualized in lived family experience. We should seek to cultivate juris-
prudence on citizenship that reflects the limited scope of immigrant children's
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citizenship has certainly mitigated the effects of immigration policy
by conferring a status-means for immigrant juveniles, eventually
culminating in legal pathways for their immigrant parents, birthright
citizenship as an inherent "benefit" for immigrant children is doubt-
ful. The phenomenon of mixed-status families as an entity invariably
compromises the benefits of citizenship possessed by individual
citizens within the family unit. When one particular citizen receives a
specific benefit of citizenship, such as food stamps or Medicaid, that
benefit must be shared among the whole family, which means that
those non-citizens too absorb the citizenship benefits. Citizenship
benefits themselves are therefore dispersed and increasingly reduced,
the greater the size of the family.144 The argument, in response, is
that this reductionism of the potency of citizenship benefits for
mixed-status families is but a necessary evil for the more vital ability
to stay in the U.S.
rights in order to tackle much harder questions regarding the role of the immigrant
child relative to adult immigrant parents.
144 See generally Thronson, Here from Here, supra note 17, at 79-80. To quell
stereotypes that immigrants present unbearable financial drains on our resources, it
is important to note that their use of federal benefits is not as extreme as public
outcry suggests. The limited availability of public benefits to immigrants under-
scores that something more than financial impact influences American distaste
toward such populations. See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration:
The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L.
REv. 1509, 1518, 1537 (1995); see also Calvo, supra note 117 (for discussion of
eligibility for various benefits). What this mystical force is presents a popular topic
of debate amongst scholars. Moreover, access to healthcare and other services is
rarely the seminal motivation for immigration into the U.S. Rather, many immi-
grants desire work and do not, at least consciously, expect to present themselves as
public charges-job prospects, income, and family unity are the primary
justifications for the increase in legal (and illegal) immigration. See WAYNE A.
CORNELIUS, THE FUTURE OF MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN CALIFORNIA: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 47 (1981); RAFAEL ALARCON, PROPOSITION 187:
AN EFFECTIvE MEASURE TO DETER UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION TO CALIFORNIA?
14-23 (1994); see also MICHAEL Fix & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, IMMIGRATION AND
IMMIGRANTS: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 3-6 (1994) (for view that immi-
grants present a positive financial impact); Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on
Noncitizens' Access to Public Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response,
42 UCLA L. REv. 1475 (1995); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism,
and the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1453 (1995).
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To be fair, it is accurate to say "marginalizing parents inevit-
ably results in marginalizing children," just as it may hurt to deny
benefits to a citizen child. The impact of any such denial reverberates
throughout the family unit. But what citizenship reductionism illu-
strates is that marginalizing children, often the legal status holders in
mixed-status households, unquestionably produces grave conse-
quences not only for the welfare of the family unit, but disgraces the
esteem of citizenship itself Mixed-status families have complex
needs and each citizen person in the household suffers from their
non-citizen parents or siblings. When it becomes too burdensome to
obtain citizenship, where juxtaposed with the reciprocal rights one
receives from the status, not only is citizenship objectified as a scarce
commodity, its elusive nature makes it not worth the investment and
further suffers from reductionism. Ever clear is that the difficulties of
mixed-status families are reflections of the inability of children to
navigate the immigration laws and of the family unit to be a focal
point in framing the petition-based system.
Undeniably, a rights-based language for citizenship would
help define the tension that exists between the government and
citizen polity 145 and could accentuate the primary inquiry involved
for any rights-conferring status: whether citizenship-a status of
constitutional and social magnitude-can truly be bestowed at birth
when government, courts, and institutions restrict the right to what is,
in effect, a privilege and license. The Constitution will act as a mere
linguistic assurance of U.S.-born immigrant children's second-rate
status, unless these children are afforded the protection given to
"American" citizens. The Citizenship Clause, then, is not the
strongest means for political incorporation and integration. While the
citizenship "right" may appear to confer outsiders a place in our
national community, unless we discern the substantive meaning of
citizenship, there will be considerable agitation as to whether being a
citizen should automatically entail additional rights and what the
scope of such rights should be. Thus, the national community so
145 See Adler, supra note 82, 24 n. 187. The formation of any citizenship language
is an ongoing dialogue that tends to escape definition. Indeed, "it is difficult to
describe the precise nature of the relationship between the theoretical and policy
levels of discourse." Id.
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vehemently debates to whom citizenship should extend because what
is truly at issue is not simply who enters our "community," but who
can access the panoply of rights and benefits that follow once legal
status is acquired.
V. UNDERSTANDING THE FACE OF
BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP: HOW
THE IMMIGRANT CHILD HAS BECOME
THE "ILLEGAL CITIZEN"
Perhaps the most illuminating aspect to citizenship discourse
is that the Constitution provides a minimalist reading into what
qualifies someone as a citizen. Put differently, what is most meaning-
ful is that the Constitution fails to specify criteria for citizenship.
While the birth and jurisdictional qualifications undoubtedly narrow
the scope of eligible persons, the document is void of what qualities
or requirements citizens of the U.S. should possess. As the Citizen-
ship Clause was intended to overcome the troubling Dred Scott
decision, 146 it is possible that the lack of citizenship criteria repre-
sented the Framers' intent against a consent or allegiance-based
citizenship system, and towards a more inclusive understanding. If
allegiance or consent were to be expected from new citizens, some
indication in the Constitution would have addressed possible proce-
dures or prerequisites to such induction into the national community.
146 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 n. 15 (1999); see also Rogers v. Bellei,
401 U.S. 815, 835 (1971) (noting that where citizenship is obtained by birth,
"Congress has no 'power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen's
citizenship without his assent."' (quoting Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257
(1967)); see also Rusk, 387 U.S. at 263 (1967) (describing framers "wanted to put
citizenship beyond the power of any government unit to destroy"); J.M. Balkin, The
Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2347 (1997) ("The citizenship clause is
a second Declaration of Independence, announcing that equal citizenship would
henceforth be available to all regardless of race or prior condition of servitude.");
James C. Ho, Defining "American": Birthright Citizenship and the Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 GREEN BAG 367, 369 (2006)
(Citizenship Clause was enacted to "overrule Dred Scott and elevate jus soli to the
level of constitutional law.").
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A conferral of naturalization power to Congress hardly seems a
sufficient justification for this constitutional vacuum.
That Congress itself has a naturalization power may imply
that under naturalization, but not citizenship, is where such criteria
and national elitism play themselves out. That there exists a Congres-
sional naturalization authority, but not a Congressional citizenship
one, instructs that one must certainly differ from the other-that it is
upon naturalization that the nation can become selective of whom
joins and is incorporated as American. 147 The uniform rule of natura-
lization, thus, functions as a uniform rule of disqualification in effect.
By imposing-at the moment of transition-what requirements or
conditions precedent we wish to impose on potential citizens, we are
defining for ourselves through the qualities we believe are valuable
for members of our community to possess. It is the uniform rule of
disqualification, then, to which restrictionism should adhere, and
such restrictionism should not be present in citizenship discourse
through volatile criticisms of jus soli citizenship. Despite these
observations, the argument for ideological exclusion of immigrant
children from the national community has always been a much
harder one to make.1
48
To fully understand the gravity of the illegal immigration
debacle, it is essential to note that the debate surrounding the issue
has taken form through state legislation, culminating in the challenge
in Arizona v. United States, 149 and federal legislation as well. 150 The
147 See W. Aaron Vandiver, Comment, Checking Ideas at the Border: Evaluating
the Possible Renewal of Ideological Exclusions, 55 EMORY L.J. 751 (2006) (for
discussion of the national self-definition process through exclusion based on
ideologies as resurrected after the War on Terror); see also Susan M. Akram,
Scheherezade Meets Kalka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14
GEO. IMmIGR. L.J. 51 (1999); Philip Monrad, Ideological Exclusion, Plenary
Power, and the PLO, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 831 (1989); Stephen R. Shapiro,
Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents, 100 HARv. L.
REV. 930 (1987).
148 This is so given that their U.S.-born identities cement a minimal level of due
process and equal protection, as a result of being both child and citizen. Exclusion
based on ideologies for the special group of children frequently offsets other
negative contingencies, such as immigration status. Shapiro, supra note 53.
149 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
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increased legislative attention given the Citizenship Clause has
focused on four positions: 1) whether amending the Constitution to
reflectjus sanguinis citizenship is preferable tojus soli citizenship, 151
2) whether altering the existing jurisprudential interpretation of the
Clause away fromjus soli is appropriate, 152 3) whether a child's abil-
150 See Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, S. 723, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/l12-s723/show; Birthright Citizenship Act of
2011, H.R. 140, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.opencongress.org/
bill/i 12-hl40/show. See also Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, H.R. 1868, 11 1th
Cong. (2009), available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h1868/text;
LEAVE Act, H.R. 994, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govit.com/
vote/congress.aspx?bill=2009-hr-994; Citizenship Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 698,
109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?
bill=h109-698; see also Devin Dwyer, Tea Party Senators Target Birthright
Citizenship for Immigrant Children, ABC NEWS (April 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.
com/Politics/illegal-immigration-republican-senatrs-target-birthright-citizenship-
bill/story?id = 13302328.
151 Professor Ragini Shah is just one of many supporters ofjus soli citizenship, but
she argues that acceptance of jus soli itself is integral to the child's development,
since the youth's attachment to place of residence and geography is essential to
formation of identities. See Ragini Shah, Sharing The American Dream: Towards
Formalizing the Status of Long-Term Resident Undocumented Children in the
United States, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 637, 665-670 (2008).
152 The legality of the proposed federal legislation has been criticized as violative of
the Citizenship Clause's intent, of preemption, of Supreme Court judicial history,
and of the core belief in equality of opportunity. See William Bingle, Note,
Birthright Citizenship: Misguided Calls for Reform, 43 U. TOL. L. REv. 669, 685-
93 (2012); see also Legislation Denying Citizenship at Birth to Certain Children
Born in the United States: Statement before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Walter
Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice),
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/defalt/files/olc/opinions/1995/12/31/op-
olc-v019-p0340.pdf (" [B]ecause the rule of citizenship acquired by birth within the
United States is the law of the Constitution, it cannot be changed through
legislation, but only by amending the Constitution. A bill.. that purports to deny
citizenship by birth to persons born within the jurisdiction of this country is
unconstitutional on its face... [t]o adopt such an amendment would not be
technically unlawful, but would flatly contradict our constitutional history and our
constitutional traditions."); Houston, supra note 102, at 724-29 (for argument that
federal legislation limiting children's citizenship to that of parents constitutes de
facto amendment of the Constitution and therefore violates § 5 enforcement power
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
2014-2015
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vol. XXXIII
ity to petition, even at the age of twenty-one, for the parents' legal
status is a proper "benefit" of citizenship, and what should be said
about attendant benefits,153 and 4) whether displacing birthright citi-
zenship with a different system would undermine notions of funda-
mental fairness to children or create a secondary caste of citizens less
deserving of full constitutional protections. 154 These four broad
Generally, arguments debating the proper interpretation of the Citizenship
Clause have fallen on the question of how "subject to the jurisdiction thereof'
should be read. Some assert that this phrase requires excluding foreign nationals
because they maintain ties and allegiance to their nation, not necessarily to the U.S.
The Supreme Court's current reading, by contrast, supports that being born on U.S.
soil is in-itself sufficient to establish "subject to the jurisdiction" of the U.S. United
States v. Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653 (1898). Yet, many scholars have argued that Wong
Kim Ark is not dispositive of the citizenship question because that case concerned
the children born to lawful residents, therefore raising the ever popular consent-
based theories of citizenship and whether illegal aliens really are subject to U.S.
jurisdiction when they are also citizens of other countries. See Katherine Pettit,
Addressing the Call for the Elimination of Birthright Citizenship in the United
States: Constitutional and Pragmatic Reasons to Keep Birthright Citizenship
Intact, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 265, 268 (2006); Dan Stein & John Bauer,
Interpreting the 14th Amendment: Automatic Citizenship for Children of Illegal
Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 127, 130 (1996). These scholars are not
without constitutional support in their opinion that jus soli citizenship remains
fragile and that birthright citizenship may be inapposite to the original intent of the
Citizenship Clause. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884); United States v.
Cmikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875); see also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162,
167-68 (1874) (cases raising specter of uncertainty as to whether children born in
the U.S. to noncitizen parents are themselves citizens); see also Drimmer, supra
note 116, at 671.
... Parents can petition for their children under immigration law. The same ability
does not extend to children who must wait until they turn twenty-one to petition.
Only when these children are no longer "children" can they ultimately employ the
immigration laws to unify with family. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
Further, under § 1153(d), a child entering the U.S. does not extend derivative status
to that child's other parent or siblings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (2012).
154 The Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of "[a]ll persons" demonstrates an intent
to be inclusive, as it stated "strongly and unequivocally that there is only one class
of United States citizens." Rebecca Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil
Rights and John Bingham 's Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 730-31
(2003); Barnhart, supra note 126, at 559 ("The benefit of jus soli is that the United
States will continue to have no caste of hereditary aliens, which is consistent with
the intent of the framers. By eliminating the "second generation problem" for
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overviews of prevailing citizenship discourse fail to reach the core
issue: the need to address how the citizenship modality intersects
with being a child, an immigrant, and in a family.
The first two positions regarding constitutional amendment
or current interpretation of the Citizenship Clause have been dis-
cussed in detail and I need not reiterate the strong arguments on both
sides. 155 Rather, I wish to focus on the third and fourth points, which
garner less attention from both policy makers and scholars. Anchor
baby rhetoric continually emphasizes how adult illegal aliens
traverse the immigration laws by circumventing restrictions through
their U.S.-born children. 156 Opponents of current immigration laws
do not appreciate that immigrant children have the ability to petition
for their parents, not that they harbor particular ill will toward
immigrant children generally. However, the fact that these children
must wait until the age of twenty-one, before the petitioning process
can begin, contradicts the rhetoric that anchor babies can immedi-
ately chain migrate their parents into the U.S. Indeed, "[c]ontrary to
popular myth, current immigration law does not provide an avenue to
legal immigration status for any person willing to wait long enough
immigrants, citizenship encourages assimilation and involvement in the political
system.") (internal citations omitted).
155 See Houston, supra note 102. But the Supreme Court has yet to specifically
answer if the Fourteenth Amendment applies to children of undocumented immi-
grants. See Barnhart, supra note 126, at 556; Edward Erler, Citizenship, in THE
HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 384, 384 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds.,
2005) (observing that Senator Trumball's comments that American Indians'
preserve allegiance to their tribes and remain sovereign entities necessitated
exclusion from the benefit of Fourteenth Amendment citizenship). Plyler v. Doe
remains the Court's seminal opinion on undocumented children and has been
severely criticized as results-oriented and devoid of future application or litigious
value.
156 See Natalie Smith, Developments in the Legislative Branch, 20 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 325, 327 (2006) (quoting Proceedings, Third Conference on Nationality, Eur.
Parl. Ass. (Oct. 11-12, 2004)) ("undocumented aliens and their progeny represent a
net expense to society, that they dilute the traditional ethnicity, that they foster
disrespect for the law, and that they provide an incentive to avoid normal
immigration procedures.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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in some mythical line." 157 What this shows, however, is that oppo-
nents of birthright citizenship truly disagree with this petitioning
ability itself: that even at the age of twenty-one, children of undocu-
mented parents nonetheless do not deserve to have the family struc-
ture preserved. For these opponents, imputed transfer of status is the
golden rule and petitioning ability is the straw that breaks the camel's
back.
Proponents of analyzing birthright citizenship's impact on
children from the third and fourth standpoints observe that jus soli
citizenship has alleviated harsh consequences of restrictionism and
comport with increased protection generally afforded children, as a
vulnerable group, and with our moral obligations as a nation. 158 This
contingency of scholars is substantial and this argument is certainly
at least intuitively appealing. But morality rarely plays a large role
when distributional justice and allocation of resources demand
attention to those legally permissible within our borders. To be fair,
there is certainly some appeal in creating constitutional clarity by
simply divesting immigrant children of the benefits of the Citizen-
ship Clause, and therefore, creating a uniform rule that immigrant
children do not deserve the heightened protection traditionally
afforded citizens. The state of alienage law is certainly unpredictable
and in disarray; for a pro-alien decision, it frequently appears that
courts balance random contingencies, most critically being the long-
standing ties, commitment to the community, and general worthiness
of the person to whom the positive grant is to be exercised. A
uniform rule of disqualification would solve the problem of this
functional deprivation of children's citizenship right to remain in the
U.S., as court reasoning-that the citizen child's right to stay is not
157 Thronson, Of Boarders and Best Interest, supra note 72, at 51; see also Stief,
supra note 11, at 487-88.
158 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224-25 (1981) (describing children as morally
blameless and innocent); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ("if any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is
that guilt is personal and not inheritable. Even if all of one's antecedents had been
convicted of treason, the Constitution forbids its penalties to be visited upon
him..)
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extinguished upon removal-is disconcerting and remains
unconvincing.
A crucial observation by Professor Rosenbloom illuminates
the more fundamental reason for the core problem of family
separation: "tensions between the closed borders of immigration law
and the open borders of birthright citizenship." 159 It becomes clear
that more discussion of birthright citizenship and its attendant bene-
fits, that is, a focus on the third standpoint, or what I label the citizen-
benefits question, can be helpful in eliminating the creation of
mixed-status families as well as illuminating solutions to the impact
parental deportation has on immigrant family structure. The focus
and shift in framework toward addressing the "unintended conse-
quences of restrictive immigration laws and heightened border
enforcement" would do well for immigrant families than any isolated
focus on merely restrictive immigration laws or border enforcement
alone. This two-pronged approach best serves to nuance and con-
textualize the highly complicated and particular circumstances
motivating illegal immigration and the face of immigration once
within the border. The tension between closed borders and open citi-
zenship begs the question of where children and families fall within
that interplay. It is evident that families ultimately are trapped
between these diametric forces. The resulting carnage on the immi-
grant family itself-a manifestation of citizenship reductionism-
may be remedied by a proper family-centered citizenship discourse.
159 Rosenbloom, supra note 143, at 314. Indeed, family separation has increasingly
been attributed to the problems in the innigration system. See Save America
Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2007: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (testimony of Charles Kuck,
American Immigration Law Association President Elect), available at http:!!
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/38766.pdf; AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL.,
FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE AFTERMATH OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCE-
MENT 13-26 (2010); Patricia Hatch, U.S. Immigration Policy: Family Reunification,
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VI. CONSTRUCTING A PROPER FRAMEWORK
TO EXAMINE THE IMMIGRANT CHILD
The debate between whether parental or children's rights
should govern and the argument for which normative framework best
protects the child remains difficult to reconcile. 160 Indeed, in the
juvenile law context, fierce advocates for each framework present
strong arguments for why their respective standard best protects the
child's needs and well-being. 161 For the immigrant child stuck
between two worlds,162 there may be situations where a parental
rights standard is preferable to a best interests standard, and vice
versa. As Professor Marcia Zug has argued, "in the context of
undocumented immigrant families, a parental rights approach is
160 See Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of
the Child. A False Dichotomy in the Context ofAdoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 63, 66 (1995) (discussing either-or dichotomy in adoption context and
stating that replacing parent-focused standards for child-focused ones would disturb
due process protections of both parents and children); Clare Huntington, Rights
Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLAL. REv. 637, 638-40 (2006).
161 See, e.g., MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
25, 38-43 (2005) (arguing that parental rights doctrine is preferable to best interests
doctrine); James G. Dwyer, Parent 's Religion and Children 's Welfare: Debunking
the Doctrine of Parent's Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1371, 1439 (1994) (arguing that
children's rights should be elevated over parental rights).
162 As both a child and an immigrant, the immigrant child possessing birthright
citizenship can be said to exist in three worlds, not two: existing as child, immi-
grant, and as citizen. This third definitional category combined with the first should
lead courts to offer stronger constitutional protections than it has. Rather, courts
have relegated the case of immigrant children to being secondary citizens, despite
having proper legal status, because of their immigrant parents. Where many
scholars have focused on analyzing the intersectionality of child and immigrant,
few articles have addressed the intersection of all three identities. See David B.
Thronson, Entering the Mainstream: Making Children Matter in Immigration Law,
38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 393, 402 (2010) [hereinafter Thronson, Entering the
Mainstream] ("Rather, courts have relegated the case of U.S.-born immigrant
children to being secondary citizens, despite having proper legal status, because of
their undocumented parents."); see also Newman, Birthright Citizenship, supra
note 14, at 440 (describing children of undocumented immigrants as the most
vulnerable group because of the fear against illegal immigration and their illegal
parents) (citing NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 85, at
178).
Critiquing Birthright Citizenship
appropriate before deportation, but once a child's parents have been
deported, reunification and termination decisions must be made
under a best-interest-of-the-child standard." 163 This dual acceptance
of both standards for an immigrant family, according to Zug, pro-
vides the proper balance: a parental rights standard permits parents to
care for and maintain contact with their children, thus providing a
normal parent-child relationship, and the best interest of the child
standard provides the ideal framework to argue in a removal
proceeding that the child would suffer extreme and unusual hardship
if the parent is removed from the U.S.
164
A rigid either-or standard simply would not protect the
immigrant juvenile in all circumstances. 165 Both standards have their
place and a flexible dual approach offers the strongest protections for
not only protecting the rights of the child, but honoring the integrity
and interests of the family unit as an entity itself Immigration law
has not developed to accommodate the increasingly discernible role
the family unit plays-most people do not cross the border to
establish a life divorced from their family. Rather, families them-
selves immigrate and our immigration system, whether during the
visa petitioning process or the removal proceeding, has adjusted
neither to that reality nor the problems that arise from family-
oriented immigrations, such as the mixed-status family phenome-
non. 166 The question is not whether to advance parental interests over
children's interests or whether prioritizing certain institutional actors
as child-agents best preserves child autonomy or parental freedom to
"rear their own children." 167 Rather, the primary inquiry must be
what best preserves family unity during the parent-child relationship
163 Zug, supra note 135, at 1182.
164 Id.165 Id. ("parental rights and children's rights can and must coexist").
166 Simply put, while immigration laws incorporate family-based petitions and
direct sponsorship of certain members, that approach to physical admission into the
U.S. fails to respect the value of the family as a unit. See Thronson, Here from
Here, supra note 17, at 61-66.
167 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (among the liberty interests
protected by the due process clause is the right to "establish a home and bring up
children,... [which is] essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
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as well as keeps the family within the U.S. 168 Fulfilling these con-
flicting goals requires an exhaustive review of how our immigration
machine perpetuates family dissolution and the development of more
creative solutions to resolving these difficulties.
The painstaking difference is clear: non-citizen juveniles
must account for a possibility of removal that their citizen non-
immigrant counterparts need not worry about. 169 The interplay of
their own lack of legal status (if an unaccompanied minor) or posses-
sion thereof (for native-born citizen children) and their parents'
immigration status therefore is of paramount concern-it is yet
another contingency that complicates the question of what needs
undocumented children have. 170 While a fit parent has a right to a
168 The centrality of the family unit reverberates in international law: "family is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the State." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) at 16(3) (Dec. 10, 1948); Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 3 Dec. 1953); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. 23(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 10(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
("The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded the family,
which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society..."). U.S. immigration
law should seek to respect the family unit, as it currently separates members.
Perhaps, immigration petitioning should be family unit-based rather than individual
petitioner-based in order to curtail piecemeal immigration of families one member
at a time. Immigration laws already have a reputation as federal family law. See
Thronson, Custody and Contradictions, supra note 61, at 509-13; Thronson, Here
from Here, supra note 17, at 59 ("Through immigration laws, the government
directly and inevitably impacts decisions by immigrant families about where and
with whom they live, sanctioning some choices and prohibiting others... [t]he
application of immigration law routinely conflicts with private decisions about
family composition and integrity, and in turn family decisions regarding where to
live routinely result in the circumvention of immigration provisions.").
169 This is because core juvenile law cases do not hold sway when plenary power
influences and abrogates traditionally convincing Constitutional protections in the
domestic juvenile law context. Instead, plenary power cases subsume the generally
child-friendly juvenile common law. See Zug, supra note 135, at 1179-80.
170 In addition to the basic needs that any child will have, immigrant children also
have needs, and the state has an interest, in teaching the fundamental values of
democratic society and keeping children connected to America, the latter being an
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parent-child relationship, it is troubling to hold that the child has no
similar right to a parent-child relationship if we are to truly arrive at a
children's rights/full agency framework. Yet this is sensible, as soci-
ety does not desire that children have the determinative or ultimate
decision regarding the identity of their caretakers, especially due to
their age, decision-making capacity, and the possible unfitness of the
parents themselves. It is evident that for children to have this right
flowing reciprocally back to the parent, that is, to possess a parent-
child relationship as well, the concept of citizenship must retain the
immigrant child's ability to petition. Put another way, the petitioning
ability must continue to be a "proper benefit" of citizenship.
But even this point raises a fundamental difficulty: we want
to protect immigrant child-citizens' rights to reside in the U.S. but to
do so an appropriate caretaker must care for the child. We must
account for the fact that he or she is still a child and the person usu-
ally fit to care for that child is determined by our immigration laws to
be unfit parents upon prolonged detention, and that subjecting the
immigrant child to foster care undermines the family structure. These
are incredibly sophisticated questions and this article only proposes a
starting-point to launch such discussion.
More on point, however, is that status explains the removal of
immigrant children from any parental structure, and the detention
system provides no viable avenues to maintain a normal parent-child
relationship during that time. Since immigration detention is likely to
continue, there must be concessions to accommodate this deprivation
of parental rights and its analog, the deprivation of the citizen
immigrant child's interest in a relationship with his or her parents.
The government's strong interest in reducing illegal entry should not
be able to outweigh the immigrant child's interest in maintaining
normal family structure while in the U.S. The government may have
a compelling interest in deterring illegal immigration and in
deporting those already inside, but that rationale founders in substan-
tiating deterioration of parent-child normalcy once family relations
are established. An immigrant child whose parent is in civil
even stronger state interest when the child is also a native born citizen. Id. at 1147-
53.
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immigration detention should have the ability to have contact with
his or her parents and to maintain as ordinary a parent-child relation-
ship as possible. 171 This is the least we can do, for if our intent is to
only punish parents for their illegal entry, then why likewise punish
the immigrant child by forbidding parental contact? 172 Detention
should only serve to punish the duplicitous adult, and because of that
principal proposition, the collateral effect of denying a parent-child
relationship is bizarre and anathema to fundamental principles of
fairness and justice.
CONCLUSION
The division between undocumented children and citizen
children is a fine one: the only difference is legal status-all other
171 Rather, the narrative demonstrates that meaningful parenting cannot occur when
the parent is incarcerated and that a prison sentence severs the parent-child bond.
See CARLENE WEAR SIMONS, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, CALIFORNIA LAW AND THE
CHILDREN OF PRISONERS 3 (2003) (describing current law as creating a "commit a
crime and lose your child policy"); Genty, supra note 79, at 38.
172 Disrupting the parent-child relationship through the parent's detention subjects
tremendous psychological and emotional trauma on the immigrant child. See
Kennedy, supra note 11, at 84-95 (for research on the impact of incarceration on
children, family, and parents); Tanya Krupat, Invisibility and Children 's Rights:
The Consequences of Parental Incarceration, 29 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 39, 40
(2007); Joseph Murray & David P. Farrrington, The Effects of Parental
Imprisonment on Children, 37 CRIME & JUST. 133, 172 (2008). Ironically, the
ASFA, enacted to preserve family reunification through expeditious termination
hearings, has had the reverse effect for immigrant families. This demonstrates that
what is family law is "American" family law; that is, the immigrant family as an
entity is not one that deserves protection. The immigrant family is rather an
anomaly in family law, their mixed status rendering the unit unstable. The
traditional "family" in immigration law is a fractured one. The traditional
understanding of family does not incorporate the contingency of legal status and
how that status disrupts or alters what the family should look like, how it functions,
is treated, or torn apart. See Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing
Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REv.
577, 579 (1997) (observing that the "'othering' of poor families, particular when
they are of color, makes it easy for the dominant culture to devalue them: to view
them as dysfunctional and not families at all."); see also Twila L. Perry, Family
Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 345 (1996)
(discussing the impact of racism and sexism's confluence on family law).
Critiquing Birthright Citizenship
needs remain identical and possibly heightened for the case of
undocumented children. Their lack of immigration status their
parents' separate immigration status and becomes a troubling consi-
deration for many social agencies that desires to protect children.
Furthermore, it is essential to emphasize the continuing validity of
citizenship despite my professed critiques that it suffers from reduc-
tionism and an identity crisis. These deficiencies can be salvaged if
citizenship discourse adapts to define its substantive meaning, and
tackles the permanent question of citizen-benefits and the need for
contextualization in the family unit.
Limiting birthright citizenship is therefore not the answer.
Moreover, such a creation of an underclass of undocumented,
without-status children would only serve to impede their integration
into the U.S. political economy and coerce them into frustrated
households where all members lack status. These immigrants,
children-included, would fail to develop allegiances necessary for
citizens to become productive contributors to American society. It is
unlikely that restricting or abolishing birthright citizenship would
deter illegal immigration. Employment opportunities, even without
the possibility of having a U.S.-born citizen child, continue to serve
as a catalyst for immigrants' entry into the U.S., not their desire to
leech off public assistance. Moreover, the need to escape persecution
continues to factor into the choice to breach the border, such that any
limitations would do little to prevent undesired immigration. We
would, through any restriction onjus soli citizenship, be punishing
the immigrant children while providing little actual effect on the
immigration "invasion." 173 As we dampen children's rights, we
173 In fact, the numbers of immigrants at least detained by CBP appears to be
decreasing over the three most recent fiscal years. Department of Homeland
Security statistics reveal the following for border apprehensions: 2011 (340, 252),
2010 (463,382), 2009 (556,032). John Simanski & Lesley M. Sapp, Immigration
Enforcement Actions: 2011, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. 3 (2012), http://www.
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/inmmigration-statistics/enforcement ar
2011.pdf. See also 2011 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC. 91 (2012), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
immigmtion-statistics/yearbook/2011/ois yb_2 0 1 1.pdf (reporting alien apprehen-
sion numbers for years 1925-2011). Pursuant to this Yearbook, in 2011, 641,633
were apprehended, compared to 752,329 in 2010, and 869,857 in 2009. Id. Indeed,
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functionally allow plenary immigration power to muddle the distinc-
tion between domestic juvenile law and federal immigration law.
There must be the recognition that meaningful child participation in
the remedies and structures of the immigration laws is essential to
acknowledgment of the child immigrant as a non-derivative human
being with substantive and enforceable rights. Perhaps, someday, our
language for citizenship will evolve to keep pace with the changing
face of immigration within our borders.
it appears that the numbers of illegal entrants is decreasing for the past three years.
Any "invasion" is certain hyperbole.
